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THE AFTERLIFE OF FORD AND PANETTI: EXECUTION 
COMPETENCE AND THE CAPACITY TO ASSIST COUNSEL 
CHRISTOPHER SEEDS* 
  The capacity to assist counsel and communicate a defense once held a 
central place in assessing competence for execution. Since Ford v. 
Wainwright, however, courts have discarded this measure, viewing Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion, which required only that a prisoner understand 
the execution as mortal punishment for a capital crime, as the Eighth 
Amendment rule.  In a significant development, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Panetti v. Quarterman—its first interpreting Ford—sends notice that 
Powell’s statements on the substantive standard are not Ford’s rule, providing 
a long overdue opportunity to address whether executing prisoners with severe 
mental illness who lack the capacity to assist counsel contravenes evolving 
standards of decency.  Current concerns with the execution of innocent 
prisoners and difficulties determining execution competence since Ford 
support reinstating the capacity to assist counsel in the Eighth Amendment 
test.  This Article, urging future work in courts and scholarship, initiates a 
discussion about the proper scope of the Ford prohibition. 
INTRODUCTION 
The present competence of a defendant has always been a critical concern 
of the criminal justice system, from arrest to execution.  Testing for a 
defendant’s or prisoner’s capacity to understand the legal proceedings and 
ability to appreciate the relationship of those proceedings to his or her own 
case has long protected the dignity of the defendant and the criminal justice 
system; and a defendant’s or prisoner’s capacity to reason sufficiently to 
identify relevant facts and thereby present a defense has provided, in turn, a 
firm measure of reliability.  Together, these overlapping capacities form a 
construct that has carried from the common law to the present day in standards 
for competence to stand trial, to plead guilty, and to waive counsel. 
 
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; former Deputy Capital Defender, New York 
State Capital Defender Office, and Judy Clarke Fellow and Staff Attorney, Center for Capital 
Litigation, Columbia, South Carolina.  The author thanks John H. Blume, Stephen P. Garvey, and 
Sheri Lynn Johnson for their helpful comments. 
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Since the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Ford v. Wainwright,1 
however, one of these traditional underpinnings of legal competence—the 
capacity to assist counsel and communicate a defense—has not been 
considered part of the constitutional measure of competence for execution.  As 
Ford declared an Eighth Amendment prohibition on executing the “insane,” 
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, long viewed as articulating the 
substantive standard, dismissed the capacity to assist counsel as obsolete given 
procedural protections and collateral opportunities for appeal that now exist in 
capital cases.2  Justice Powell recognized only a prisoner’s ability to 
understand the impending execution and the relationship between that 
punishment and the prisoner’s capital offense—measures of a prisoner’s 
capacity to experience retribution—as meaningful contemporary rationales for 
not executing a person with severe mental illness.3 
Several years later, the Court made passing reference to Ford, quoting 
Justice Powell’s articulation of the substantive standard.4  Ever since, the 
capacity to assist counsel has been viewed as a dispensable relic.  Once 
incumbent in the common law heritage of the prohibition on executing the 
insane, it has been removed—in effect upon a single Justice’s view that it lost 
its relevance—without ever receiving the attention of the full Court.  This 
disappearance is remarkable, considering that the capacity to communicate a 
defense, with or without counsel, once played a central role in justifying the 
prohibition.  Also, it is ironic that this common law measure of reliability has 
been shorn in the Eighth Amendment forum of “heightened reliability,” where 
it should be most prized. 
As this notion that Hale, Hawles, Blackstone, and Coke all identified as the 
touchstone for competence from arrest to execution has dwindled to a curiosity 
that jurisdictions need not entertain before killing a prisoner who has severe 
mental illness, so too have others that had previously held sway; courts have 
diminished the importance of the rationales that to execute an incompetent 
prisoner disrespects human dignity and violates the charitable character of 
religious faith as it denies the opportunity to spiritually prepare for death.5  
Given the apparent precedential force of Justice Powell’s Ford concurrence, 
strong arguments that any rationale other than retribution is significant in the 
execution context have long fallen on deaf ears.  The capacity to assist counsel 
presents an acute example.  When, not long after Ford, Justice Marshall urged 
the entire Court to address whether the capacity to assist counsel should have 
any bearing on execution competence under the Eighth Amendment, his call 
 
 1. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 2. Id. at 418–29 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989). 
 5. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406–08. 
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was silenced by the seeming precedence of Powell’s Ford concurrence.6  In the 
few cases to entertain a defendant’s assertion that the capacity to assist counsel 
is a prerequisite for execution, courts have denied the claims with slim 
reasoning, simply citing Powell in Ford or reiterating Powell’s argument 
before summarily agreeing.7  The landscape has become so bleak that some 
time has passed since diligent capital counsel raised the issue as a matter of 
course or with any hope of relief. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Panetti v. Quarterman,8 which is 
the Court’s first interpretation of Ford and its first direct consideration of the 
substantive standard,9 is no different in some respects.  Panetti’s counsel did 
not argue that the capacity to assist counsel should be part of the Ford inquiry.  
The Court never says that a prisoner need reason sufficiently to communicate a 
defense before an execution may proceed.  This is so, even though Panetti, 
who was allowed to represent himself at trial despite a lengthy history of lapses 
and relapses into incompetence,10 may have important information to add in 
 
 6. See Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1240 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
 7. A few commentators have argued along the lines of Justice Marshall, and persuasively, 
that the capacity to assist counsel retains validity in the Ford context.  See, e.g., Richard J. 
Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures, 54 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1177–78 (2005); Roberta M. Harding, “Endgame”: Competency and the 
Execution of Condemned Inmates—A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition 
Against Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 105, 134–37 
(1994).  But many more have accepted Justice Powell’s analysis, in effect dismissing the 
relevance of the capacity to assist counsel to the Ford inquiry as a foregone conclusion.  See, e.g., 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL 
DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 92–93 (2006) (“With respect to the first rationale [that ‘[a]n 
incompetent person might be unable to provide counsel with last minute information leading to 
vacation of the sentence’], as Powell noted in his concurrence, the view that competency is 
required to assist the attorney ‘has slight merit today,’ because defendants are entitled to effective 
assistance of counsel at trial and appeal, as well as to multiple post-conviction reviews of the 
sentence.”).  Such adoption without analysis is exemplary of the easy approval Powell’s 
concurrence has received.  See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 2006); Coe 
v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 825–26 (6th Cir. 2000); cf. Rohan v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 811 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (considering more thoroughly the assistance rationale, given current procedural 
protections in capital cases, in the context of competency to proceed in federal post-conviction 
proceedings). 
 8. 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007). 
 9. See generally Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death 
Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257 (2007); Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. 
Quarterman: Is There a “Rational Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285 (2007).  The author assisted in drafting an amicus 
brief submitted in support of Scott Panetti by the National Alliance on Mental Illness.  See Brief 
for National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Panetti, 
127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407) [hereinafter NAMI Amicus Brief Supporting Petitioner]. 
 10. See Bonnie, supra note 9, at 259–60. 
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his defense of the death penalty even as late in the process as execution.  
Panetti illustrates the extent to which the capacity to assist counsel and 
communicate a defense has vanished as an integral part of our society’s 
prohibition on executing persons with severe mental illness. 
And yet, the Court’s decision in Panetti removes a barrier.  Significantly, 
interpreting Ford for the first time, the Court explains that Justice Powell’s 
statements on substance are merely alternative articulations of the general 
principles set forth in Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court—not Ford’s 
rule.11  “[O]ther rationales,”12 in addition to retribution, the Court recognizes, 
are offended by applications such as the “mere awareness” test that the Fifth 
Circuit applied to Panetti.13  To say that the Court’s decision invites lower 
courts to revisit the place of the capacity to assist counsel and other rationales 
in the Eighth Amendment standard may be an overstatement.  But it is no small 
matter to recognize that Panetti permits such consideration, opening the floor 
to a discussion of common law rationales beyond an inmate’s capacity to 
understand why he is being punished. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  The first reviews the landscape of the 
prohibition on executing individuals with severe mental illness before and after 
Ford, with two points of focus: (1) the central place that communicating a 
defense held as a common law rationale for the prohibition and later as an 
element of related state substantive standards; and (2) the disappearance of this 
capacity from the Eighth Amendment analysis based on Justice Powell’s (a) 
debatable and (b) unvetted conclusions in Ford. 
The second part analyzes the Court’s decision in Panetti.  The structure of 
the Court’s opinion, the language the Court chooses, and the manner in which 
the Court applies or does not apply legal doctrine all show that Justice Powell’s 
concurrence did not make a rule.  Powell’s concurrence is best read, instead, as 
one Justice’s argument for what the substantive standard should be, not as 
binding precedent. 
The final part of this Article is a discussion for the future, focused on one 
rationale: the capacity to assist counsel. Following Panetti, the substantive 
Ford inquiry is open to a reassessment of what our society demands before we 
execute someone who has severe mental illness.  Do our evolving standards of 
decency demand only that a prisoner have the capacity to internalize society’s 
vengeance before execution?  Or must we demand more?  Following Panetti, 
these questions are due meaningful attention by litigants and courts.  Courts 
may consider, without restriction, whether rationales other than retribution play 
a meaningful contemporary role. After Ford but before Panetti, Justice 
Marshall called for the Supreme Court to properly determine whether 
 
 11. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2860. 
 12. Id. at 2861. 
 13. Id. at 2860–61. 
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executing prisoners with severe mental illness who lack the capacity to 
communicate a defense is cruel and unusual punishment.  Thus, this final part 
revisits Marshall’s arguments as well as similar arguments more recently 
raised and discusses advantages in reliability, consistency, and dignity to 
including the capacity to communicate a defense alongside the criteria 
approved by Justice Powell.  
I.  FORD BEFORE PANETTI 
A common refrain in Ford commentary is that common law rationales for 
the prohibition on executing persons who have severe mental illness are many 
and the standard accordingly imprecise.14  Consequently, the argument goes, 
formulation of a more precise substantive standard awaits clarification of the 
rule’s rationale.15  But perhaps this confuses the standard’s generality with 
imprecision and overstates the ambiguity of the rationales, both as they stood 
in the common law history and on the eve of Ford.  In 1986, only a handful of 
states had articulated a substantive standard, but among those states, a strong 
majority included the capacity to assist counsel as a requisite for competence.16 
If the survey of states and common law on which Justice Powell’s Ford 
concurrence relied for dismissing the capacity to assist counsel as a basis for 
the prohibition is debatable, then so are his arguments, barely vetted since.  For 
one, as noted elsewhere, Powell’s argument, which is rooted in modern 
procedural and collateral review protections, assumes a right to effective 
assistance of counsel and stays in post-conviction proceedings pending 
restoration of competence that do not exist in many jurisdictions.17  This and 
other opposing lines of reasoning have long been dismissed without serious 
analysis because Powell’s opinion has posed as Ford’s precedent. 
 
 14. Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 35, 60–61 (1986); see Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, 
Standard, and Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement, 
51 LA. L. REV. 995, 1008–09 (1991); Paul J. Larkin, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the 
Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 780–82 (1980); Note, Insanity of 
the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533, 540–41 (1979). 
 15. Ward, supra note 14, at 59, 62–64 (discussing Henry Weihofen, A Question of Justice: 
Trial or Execution of an Insane Defendant, 37 A.B.A. J. 651, 652 (1951)); see Gray v. Lucas, 710 
F.2d 1048, 1054 (5th Cir. 1983) (attributing lack of definition in part to the lack of clarity of the 
“underlying social reason for the general principle”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. 
Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 394–95 
(1962); see also George G. Grover, Comment, Criminal Law—Constitutional Law—Execution of 
Insane Persons, 23 S. CAL. L. REV. 246, 256 (1950) (“If the reason [for the prohibition] is that he 
should have an opportunity to suggest items in extenuation or make arguments for executive 
clemency, then the standard should probably involve intelligence factors as well as moral 
awareness.”). 
 16. Ward, supra note 14, at 101–07. 
 17. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Common Law 
No one disputes the existence of a prohibition on executing the insane at 
common law.  And no one disputes that the capacity to communicate a defense 
was then a core rationale for the prohibition: “[a] central purpose of the 
common law ban on executing the mentally ill was to afford the defendant the 
opportunity to defend his life before the sentence was carried out.”18  The 
rationale was the same for Blackstone and Hale.19  Hawles also identified a last 
opportunity for those imprisoned to prove innocence as the “true reason” for 
the prohibition.20  Multiple reasons were given at common law for why 
 
 18. Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Panetti v. 
Quarterman, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407) [hereinafter Legal Historians] 
(presenting views of professors at Princeton University, University of Oxford, University of 
Michigan, Columbia University Law School, University of Michigan Law School, and Arizona 
State Law School). 
 19. Id. at 23.  Hale recognized that: 
If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before his arraignment he 
becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be arraigned during such his phrenzy, but 
be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed; the reason is, because he cannot 
advisedly plead to the indictment. . . .  And if such person after his plea, and before his 
trial, become of non sane memory, he shall not be tried; or, if after his trial he become of 
non sane memory, he shall not receive judgment; or, if after judgment he become of non 
sane memory, his execution shall be spared; for were he of sound memory, he might 
allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution. 
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 18–19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 SIR 
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34–35 (Sollum Emlyn ed., London, E. 
& R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736)).  This is echoed in Blackstone: 
[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these 
incapacities: no, not even for treason itself.  Also, if a man in his sound memory commits 
a capital offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be 
arraigned for it: because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he 
ought.  And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for 
how can he make his defence?  If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses 
before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of 
nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the 
English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in 
stay of judgment or execution. 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *24.  “Another cause of regular reprieve is, if the 
offender become non compos . . . if after judgment, he shall not be ordered for execution: for 
‘furiosus solo furore punitur,’ and the law knows not but he might have offered some reason, if in 
his senses, to have stayed these respective proceedings.”  Id. at *389 (emphasis added). 
 20. Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Tryal of Charles Bateman, in 3 A COMPLEAT 
COLLECTION OF STATE-TRYALS AND PROCEEDINGS UPON IMPEACHMENTS FOR HIGH TREASON 
AND OTHER MISDEMEANOURS 651, 652 (Thomas Salmon ed., London, Timothy Goodwin 1719).  
Hawles wrote: 
[F]or nothing is more certain in Law, than that a Person who falls mad after a Crime 
suppos’d to be committed shall not be try’d for it; and if he fall mad after Judgment, he 
shall not be executed. . . .  [T]he true reason for the Law I think to be this, a Person of non 
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executing the incompetent was undignified.21  But only the requirement that 
the prisoner have the capacity to reason sufficiently to communicate a defense 
protected a judgment’s reliability.22 
There is one other point to make about the English common law.  The 
English jurists and the old law dictionaries, justice of the peace manuals, and 
legal historians all agree that the “assessment of a defendant’s fitness to be 
tried, convicted, or executed was broad-gauged, based on an estimation of his 
generalized ‘understanding.’”23  In assessing incompetence, “courts did not 
have the sophisticated and intricate diagnostic tools and categories developed 
by modern psychiatry.”24  They simply focused, at trial and post-verdict, on the 
“commonly recognized and conspicuous manifestations of insanity”25 without 
“seek[ing] to deconstruct the delusions of mentally ill defendants to determine 
 
sana Memoria, and a Lunatick during his Lunacy, is by an Act of God . . . disabled to 
make his just Defence, there may be circumstances lying in his private Knowledge, which 
would prove his Innocency, of which he can have no advantage, because not known to the 
Persons who shall take upon them his Defence. 
Id. 
 21. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986).  Other rationales for the prohibition 
included that to execute the incompetent offends humanity, that to do so serves as “no example to 
others,” EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 6 
(6th ed., London, W. Rawlins 1680), that madness is its own punishment, and the faith-based 
reason that it is “uncharitable to dispatch . . . [unfit] into another world,” Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 
(quoting Hawles, supra note 20, at 653) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22. Documenting the common law roots, Justice Frankfurter urged that the historical sources 
are not to be taken lightly, that “[t]he practical considerations are not less relevant today than they 
were when urged by Sir John Hawles and Hale and Hawkins and Blackstone in writings which 
nurtured so many founders of the Republic.”  Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 19 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting).  The primary reason he gave was reliability: 
If a man has gone insane, is he still himself?  Is he still the man who was convicted?  In 
any event ‘were he of sound memory, he might allege somewhat’ to save himself from 
doom.  It is not an idle fancy that one under sentence of death ought not, by becoming non 
compos, be denied the means to ‘allege somewhat’ that might free him.  Such an 
opportunity may save life, as the last minute applications to this Court from time to time 
and not always without success amply attest. 
Id.  Frankfurter, in Solesbee, cited three twentieth century cases in support; in each, a state 
recognized a standard for the prohibition grounded in assistance: People v. Geary, 131 N.E. 652, 
655–56 (Ill. 1921); In re Grammer, 178 N.W. 624, 626 (Neb. 1920); In re Smith, 176 P. 819, 823 
(N.M. 1918). 
 23. Legal Historians, supra note 18, at 4. 
 24. Id. at 16 (citing JOEL PETER EIGEN, WITNESSING INSANITY: MADNESS AND MAD-
DOCTORS IN THE ENGLISH COURT 58 (1995)). 
 25. Id. at 4; see id. at 16–18 (discussing Hale’s distinctions of degrees between “perfect and 
partial insanity”). 
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whether some fragment was tethered to reality.”26  The law “did not bequeath 
definitive standards to determine competence for execution.”27 
Today, despite more developed processes for assessing mental impairment 
and capability, the test for competence to stand trial28 remains open textured 
and retains the core concerns from the common law—that a defendant “(1) 
understand the charges and the basic elements of the adversary system . . . , (2) 
appreciate one’s situation as a defendant in a criminal prosecution . . . , and (3) 
relate pertinent information to counsel concerning the facts of the case.”29  
These overlapping but distinct capacities are a modern reflection of the 
generalized understanding required at common law for competence from arrest 
to execution.30  And they serve the same social purposes.31  The dignity of the 
 
 26. Id. at 19; see id. at 20 (“[T]he determination of fitness for trial or execution, occurred at a 
higher level of generality, taking into account the general understanding and actions of the 
defendants.”). 
 27. Id. at 21.  It has been argued that the capacity we often demarcate by the ability to assist 
counsel historically also reflected the capacity to plead for clemency.  See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 
517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996); Legal Historians, supra note 18, at 23 (citing JAMES H. LANGBEIN, 
THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 60–61, 324–25 (2003)).  And it has been 
suggested that the “commentary on the common law available at the time of the Framing and 
before supports the notion that the bar to executing the mentally ill required a lesser showing of 
impairment than at earlier stages of the proceedings.”  Id. at 15–16 (discussing BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 19, and Hawles, supra note 20).  Whether or not one agrees, the commentary shows at 
least the seriousness and care with which the law took the prohibition on executing individuals 
with mental illness. 
 28. The test for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant “has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”  Drope 
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see 
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (applying the Dusky standard for competence to 
guilty pleas and waivers of counsel, requiring “rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings”). 
 29. NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR 
STUDIES 46–47 (2002); see Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond 
Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 570–75 (1993). 
 30. POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 29, at 47 (“Although they probably overlap a great deal 
empirically, abundant clinical experience demonstrates that they are not congruent, and that the 
ability to perform one set of tasks does not necessarily predict ability to perform the other.”).  For 
example: 
Some mentally disabled defendants who understand the process and their own situations 
are unable to assist counsel; and, conversely, a delusional defendant may be able to 
understand counsel’s role and to relate relevant information but may believe that the 
criminal prosecution serves a benevolent divine plan and has no punitive purpose or 
effect. . . .  Despite the conceptual and empirical divergence of these two groups of 
capacities, however, it is sensible to combine them in a single foundational construct 
because both of these rationales, dignity and reliability, underlie the traditional bar against 
prosecution and conviction of incompetent defendants. 
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criminal process is undermined, its retributive function severed, if a defendant 
lacks understanding of the proceeding; just as importantly, the reliability of a 
judgment is cast in doubt when a defendant cannot reason sufficiently to 
distinguish relevant from irrelevant facts and communicate in his defense.32 
B. Incompetence for Execution Before Ford 
The common law prohibition was adopted by nearly every state, and some 
codified it by statute, but constitutional law on competency for execution 
developed slowly.33  The sluggishness was due in part to the infrequency with 
which execution incompetence is alleged.  It may also have resulted from 
inattention in criminal law to the death penalty.34  Tempered skepticism about 
 
Id.; see id. at 102–04 (noting discreteness of categories and need for an assessment method to 
include all three measures). 
 31. The MacArthur Studies provide that historically three social purposes have been served 
by competence requirements: (1) dignity: “the criminal process is undermined if the defendant 
lacks a basic moral understanding of the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or 
her”; (2) accuracy or reliability: which is “threatened if the defendant is unable to assist in the 
development and presentation of a defense”; and (3) autonomy: the criminal process is 
undermined if the defendant lacks the ability to make decisions, where that is called for.  
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 29, at 43.  The MacArthur Studies draw a theoretical distinction 
between “adjudicative competence” (corresponding to dignity and reliability interests) and 
“decisional competence” (corresponding to autonomy) that the Supreme Court (Godinez) does 
not.  Id. at 47; SLOBOGIN, supra note 7, at 192; see Bonnie, supra note 29, at 554–60. 
 32. POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 29, at 43.  The Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s 
interest in autonomy diminishes following conviction.  See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 
528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000). 
 33. Before Ford v. Wainwright, the Court focused on procedures, but never directly 
addressed whether the prohibition on executing the incompetent was a constitutional requirement.  
See, e.g., Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1054 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not held 
that the federal constitution bars the execution of presently insane persons.”); Welch v. Beto, 355 
F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1966) (noting that whether “due process . . . bars the execution of an 
insane person . . . is an open question which the Supreme Court of the United States has not 
decided in terms, [although] individual justices have expressed themselves to this effect”).  The 
closest the Court came was to review prisoners’ claims that state procedures allowing for 
competency determinations without judicial review (either by the governor, the warden, or ex 
parte) violated the Due Process Clause.  In each, the Court declined to address the existence of a 
constitutional right.  See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 10–12 (1950); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 
U.S. 431, 443–44 (1948); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 404 (1897).  In Caritativo v. 
California, the Court approved per curiam two judgments that accepted procedures leaving the 
sanity determination to the discretion of the prison warden.  357 U.S. 549, 550 (1958).  Four 
Justices argued for a due process right.  Id. at 556–59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see id. at 549–
50 (Harlan, J., concurring).  The Court, however, did not address the constitutionality of 
executing the incompetent again until Ford, nearly thirty years later. 
 34. See generally MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 3–19 (1973) (discussing the NAACP Legal Defense Fund death penalty 
litigation leading to Furman v. Georgia).  Before the Legal Defense Fund challenges to the death 
penalty in the late 1960s, imposition of capital punishment in the United States went largely 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
318 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:309 
frivolous claims and fears of protracted litigation, expressed in the Court’s pre-
Ford opinions, also explain why a constitutional ban on executing the severely 
mentally ill was long left alone.35 
Whatever the reason, in 1986, on the eve of Ford, all states recognized the 
prohibition, but only a handful defined its substantive scope with more 
specificity than to preclude execution of the “insane.”36  Scholarly observers 
described the state standards as “varied” and “essentially incomprehensible,”37 
 
unnoticed; capital punishment was a common law legacy, employed relatively rarely, and framed 
in standard criminal law.  State laws provided summarily when and how the death penalty was to 
be imposed—the bottom line was that once a jury found a defendant guilty of whatever the state 
determined to be a death-eligible crime the jury in most jurisdictions had unbridled discretion to 
impose a death sentence or not, without guidance or explanation, as it saw fit.  Consequently, the 
justification for imposition of the death sentence in any given case was largely unquestioned.  See 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 335-40 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 35. See Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 12–13 (rejecting a constitutional ban as absurd because a 
prisoner could postpone the punishment indefinitely at will, simply by alleging insanity and 
thereby provoking an inquiry); Nobles, 168 U.S. at 406–07 (same); see also Phyle v. Duffy, 208 
P.2d 668, 675 (Cal. 1949) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“Taking refuge in insanity as a means of 
escaping execution is not a constitutional right, but a privilege that the state has conferred as an 
act of mercy or special dispensation.”).  Justice Frankfurter argued that fear of protracted 
litigation was “groundless,” and “hardly comparable” to the “grim risk” of executing an 
incompetent prisoner.  Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting risk derived 
from “treacherous uncertainties in the present state of psychiatric knowledge”). 
 36. See Ward, supra note 14, at 101–07 (cataloging state statutes); see also Gray, 710 F.2d 
at 1054 (“If indeed the federal constitution affords some right by which the execution upon state 
conviction of a presently insane person is barred (or, at least, barred in the absence of an 
evidentiary hearing prior to execution), the test for insanity of this nature has never been 
definitely established and varies between the respective states as well as in the common law.”).  
The Gray court, unpersuaded by Gray’s proffer under any standard, chose not to address the 
existence of a constitutional right.  Id. at 1056.  A number of courts, like Gray, sidestepped the 
issue.  See, e.g., Goode v. Wainwright, 731 F.2d 1482, 1483–84 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 37. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 14, at 60–61.  Ward inventoried state standards for 
competence for execution shortly before Ford.  Ward, supra note 14, at 60–62.  She reported that 
the standard for incompetence in twenty-two states (not all specific to the execution context) was 
simply that the prisoner must be “insane.”  Id. at 60 & n.146 (citing Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, 
Washington, and Wyoming).  She noted that four states had similarly limited descriptions: 
Delaware (“mentally ill”); Indiana (“mentally ill and in need of care and treatment by the 
department of mental health or in a mental facility”); Montana (“lacks mental fitness”); and South 
Carolina (“mentally ill or mentally retarded”).  Id.  In Florida, where the Ford case was litigated, 
the test was whether the prisoner understood the “nature and effect of the death penalty and why 
it is to be imposed upon him.”  Id. at 60 & n.148.  Two states, she reported, required the prisoner 
to be able to “consult with his attorney.”  Id. at 60 (citing Georgia caselaw interpreting the state’s 
one-word statute (Brown v. State, 113 S.E.2d 618, 620 (Ga. 1960)) and North Carolina’s statute).  
She also cited Missouri, but did not count it as a third in the text discussion.  Id. at 60 n.149.  
Ward described four states as employing:  
[a] broad standard that the inmate must have sufficient intelligence to understand the 
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showing “little consensus.”38  For some, the cause of what they perceived as 
great diversity among state standards was the lack of a clear rationale for the 
prohibition.39 
But a close look at the collected statutes and case law shows more 
agreement than the commentators recognized.  In 1986, of the eleven states 
defining the standard in more than a word (“mentally ill,” “incompetent,” 
“insane,” or “mentally ill and in need of care”), a clear majority included the 
capacity to assist counsel, and all seven states interpreting the prohibition in 
case law demanded this capacity.40  Against the background of the common 
 
nature of the proceedings against him, what he was tried for initially, the purpose of his 
punishment, and his impending fate; to know any facts which might make his punishment 
unjust or illegal; and to be able to convey that information to his attorney.   
Id. at 60–61 & n.150 (citing People v. Geary, 131 N.E. 652, 655–56 (Ill. 1921); In re Smith, 176 
P. 819, 823 (N.M. 1918); In re Keaton, 250 N.E.2d 901, 906 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); Bingham v. 
State, 169 P.2d 311, 314–15 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946)).  Yet “another broad test” she noted was 
that of Utah, which by statute defined a prisoner incompetent “if as a result of a mental disease or 
defect either he is unable to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him or the 
punishment proscribed, or he is unable to assist his attorney in his defense.”  Id. at 61 & n.151 
(emphasis added).  One state had what Ward described as an “obtuse” standard, whether an 
“inmate’s mental illness has ‘so lessened his capacity to use his customary self-control, judgment 
and discretion as to render it necessary or advisable for him to be under care.’”  Id. at 61 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Moon, 117 A.2d 96, 102 (Pa. 1955)).  And finally, again referencing 
Oklahoma, Ward concluded “one state may retain what amounts to a ‘wild beast’ standard, that 
is, ‘a state of general insanity, the mental powers being wholly obliterated.’”  Id. at 61 (quoting 
Bingham, 169 P.2d at 314). 
 38. Kirk S. Heilbrun, The Assessment of Competency for Execution: An Overview, 5 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 383, 387 (1987).  The year after Ward’s study, Heilbrun reassessed the state statutes and 
case law.  Id. at 388–91.  He identified two types of statutes—those requiring that a prisoner be 
able to “understand” and those requiring that a prisoner be able to “understand and assist 
[counsel].”  Id. at 385 (emphasis added) (suggesting the Brief for Petitioner in Ford v. 
Wainwright advocated a third type, which he dubbed “understand, assist, and prepare”).  He noted 
that two statutes required “understand” only, two statutes required “understand and assist,” and 
four statutes followed the In re Smith standard, which he stated was “arguably a form of 
‘understand and assist.’”  Id. at 386–87.  Sixteen statutes, he reported, had only a bare one-word 
description (“insane,” “incompetent,” or “unfit”), as did ten of the fourteen common law 
prohibition states.  Id. at 387.  Of the remaining four common law states, two he characterized as 
“understand and assist” and two as following a standard “that might be described as ‘mentally ill 
and in need of treatment.’”  Id.  Heilbrun concluded, like Ward, that the state laws showed “little 
consensus.”  Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 14, at 62–63. 
 40. Only Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Florida had more elaborate definitions.  Heilbrun, supra note 
38, at 388–91.  Of those, all but Florida and Pennsylvania, which adhered to a unique test 
(whether an inmate’s mental “illness so lessen[s] his capacity to use his customary self-control, 
judgment and discretion as to render it necessary or advisable for him to be under care”), required 
the capacity to assist counsel.  Id.  (alteration in original) (quoting Moon, 117 A.2d at 102).  
Illinois’s statute did not explicitly require the capacity to assist counsel, but case law did, and the 
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law, what some saw as vague and varied standards may be better explained as 
adoptions of the common law in all its generality.41  The state standards show a 
legal rule relatively unattended to, but to the extent accepted, accepted to 
measure all that the common law would have.42  If a standard reflects its 
underlying rationale, it seems that nearly every state defining incompetency for 
execution accepted the capacity to assist counsel.  Only Florida did not.43 
C. Ford v. Wainwright 
Justice Powell reached a different conclusion in his concurring opinion in 
Ford.  The question before the Court was whether the Eighth Amendment 
permits a state to execute a prisoner who appears mentally incompetent 
without having first determined the prisoner’s competence through a reliable 
and accurate fact-finding procedure.44  The substantive question—if the Eighth 
 
state supreme court had not yet interpreted the statute.  Id.  What Ward described as two states 
requiring an ability to consult with counsel, four following In re Smith (which required an ability 
to consult with counsel), and one “unique” statute (Utah, which employed a disjunctive test with 
one prong requiring ability to consult with counsel), tallies seven that required the capacity to 
assist counsel.  Ward, supra note 14, at 60–62.  Adding Missouri, which Ward mentioned only in 
a footnote, makes eight.  Id. at 60 n.149.  And the case law of two additional states, Mississippi 
and New Jersey, required the capacity to assist counsel.  Id. at 60–62.  These states endorsed a 
three-part notion of competency akin to the Dusky standard, which encompasses the general 
notion of competency at common law. 
 41. See Legal Historians, supra note 18, at 16 (“The common law appears to have painted 
insanity with a broad brush, undertaking an assessment of the manifestly delusional or irrational 
actions of a defendant.”). 
 42. Generality adheres in judicial opinions prior to Ford as well.  See, e.g., Ford v. 
Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526, 531 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., dissenting) (performing Eighth 
Amendment review of contemporary standards of decency on the prohibition on the execution of 
the “insane,” but not defining “insane”).  Judge Clark’s Eighth Amendment review looked at the 
“insane” as a class and considered the retributive and deterrent value (the two accepted 
justifications for the death penalty) of execution.  See id. at 531–32; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 43. FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985); see Ford, 752 F.2d at 527. 
 44. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).  Ford was a natural successor to Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which applied the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment, 
and Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), in which the Court approved state procedures for 
determining competence for execution but sidestepped the constitutionality of those procedures 
under the Due Process Clause.  See Ford, 477 U.S. at 405 (“Now that the Eighth Amendment has 
been recognized to affect significantly both the procedural and the substantive aspects of the 
death penalty, the question of executing the insane takes on a wholly different complexion. The 
adequacy of the procedures chosen by a State to determine sanity, therefore, will depend upon an 
issue that this Court has never addressed: whether the Constitution places a substantive restriction 
on the State’s power to take the life of an insane prisoner.”); see also Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that the Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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Amendment applies, whom does it exclude?—implicitly remained.45  Justice 
Marshall’s opinion for the Court endorsed an Eighth Amendment prohibition 
after summarizing the common law roots and finding that every state 
prohibited execution of the “insane” in some manner.46  Echoing Justice 
Frankfurter’s dissent in Solesbee, Marshall recognized six common law 
rationales, quoting Blackstone for the rationale that “had the prisoner been of 
sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or 
execution.”47  Marshall also recognized the importance of the retributive 
rationale, noting that “today, no less than before, we may seriously question 
the retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why 
he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.”48  But his 
opinion, focused on the ways in which Florida’s procedures failed the 
Constitution, did not define a substantive standard. 
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, noted that if the Eighth 
Amendment bars a category of defendants from execution, “the bounds of that 
category are necessarily governed by federal constitutional law,” and he went 
on to address “the meaning of insanity in this context.”49  Powell proposed to 
turn to the “common-law heritage and the modern practices of the States, 
which are indicative of our ‘evolving standards of decency.’”50  Citing 
Florida’s statute as an example of “[m]odern practice,” he rejected the capacity 
to assist counsel as a contemporary rationale for the prohibition: 
Modern practice provides far more extensive review of convictions and 
sentences than did the common law, including not only direct appeal but 
ordinarily both state and federal collateral review.  Throughout this process, 
 
 45. Ford originally challenged three grounds—the existence of an Eighth Amendment right 
prohibiting execution of the insane, the implementation of fair and full procedures to establish 
incompetence in furtherance of that right, and inclusion in the substance of the right not only 
Florida’s language but also the capacity to assist counsel.  See Ward, supra note 14, at 64 
(“Ford’s attorneys argued to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that a 
consult-with-counsel element should be added to Florida’s requirement that the inmate 
understand the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed upon him.”).  
During federal habeas litigation, Ford dropped the substantive issue focused on the capacity to 
assist counsel.  See Ford, 752 F.2d at 528 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“The only substantive difference 
between Ford’s eighth amendment claim and the Florida statute is based on Frankfurter’s 
contention in Solesbee that a defendant must be sufficiently competent to cooperate with his 
attorney in providing reasons why his execution should not be carried out. Since Ford has 
exhausted both his merits appeal and his collateral attacks, he concedes that this substantive 
distinction is not material in his case.”). 
 46. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409–10.  Parts I and II of the opinion were joined by Justice Powell.  
Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist filed separate dissenting opinions. 
 47. Id. at 407 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *24–25). 
 48. Id. at 409. 
 49. Id. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
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the defendant has access to counsel, by constitutional right at trial, and by 
employment or appointment at other stages of the process whenever the 
defendant raises substantial claims.  Nor does the defendant merely have the 
right to counsel’s assistance; he also has the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel at trial and on appeal.  These guarantees are far broader than those 
enjoyed by criminal defendants at common law.  It is thus unlikely indeed that 
a defendant today could go to his death with knowledge of undiscovered trial 
error that might set him free.51 
[I]n cases tried at common law execution often followed fairly quickly after 
trial, so that incompetence at the time of execution was linked as a practical 
matter with incompetence at the trial itself.  Our decisions already recognize, 
however, that a defendant must be competent to stand trial, and thus the notion 
that a defendant must be able to assist in his defense is largely provided for.52 
[A] standard that focused on the defendant’s ability to assist in his defense 
would give too little weight to the State’s interest in finality, since it implies a 
constitutional right to raise new challenges to one’s criminal conviction until 
sentence has run its course.  Such an implication is false: we have made clear 
that States have a strong and legitimate interest in avoiding repetitive collateral 
review through procedural bars.53 
In sum, Powell’s argument reduces to three reasons for rejecting the rationale: 
the existence of far more extensive procedural protections in capital cases 
(including a right to effective counsel throughout trial, direct appeal, and state 
and federal collateral review), the temporal separation of execution from trial, 
and state interests in finality. 
Thus, for Justice Powell, only the retributive rationale, and to a lesser 
extent the religious justification that a prisoner should be able to prepare for 
death (which concerned dignity of the system and dignity of the prisoner, 
 
 51. Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 52. Id. at 420–21 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)). 
 53. Id. at 421 n.2.  Powell’s view accords with that expressed by Justice Traynor of the 
California Supreme Court in Phyle v. Duffy: 
The reason ordinarily advanced against executing a man who has become insane since 
judgment is that he might, if sane, recall something in stay of execution.  Can this reason 
serve as a basis for a constitutional right not to be executed while insane?  The possibility 
that a defendant, sane at the time of his trial, will recall some fact in stay of execution 
after a period of intervening insanity is remote.  The reasoning that would establish a 
constitutional right to delay on this basis would also serve to postpone the execution of a 
sane man on the ground that a witness might conceivably be discovered thereafter whose 
testimony might save him.  If the possibility of a subsequently refreshed memory were 
enough to prevent the execution of an insane man, it would also render unconstitutional 
any capital punishment, since it is possible to speculate endlessly about the possibilities 
that would rescue a condemned man from execution provided it were delayed long 
enough.  
208 P.2d 668, 676 (1949) (Traynor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
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respectively) were still valid.  Accordingly, Powell found Florida’s standard, 
which asked only if a prisoner understood that he would be executed and the 
reason for it, sufficient.54  States, he allowed, were free to adopt a more 
expansive view of sanity in this context, but need not.55 
Justice Powell claimed to find objective support for his view in the statutes 
of two states (including Florida) and in the case precedent of another.56  “A 
number of States have more rigorous standards,” he noted, “but none disputes 
the need to require that those who are executed know the fact of their 
impending execution and the reason for it.”57  Powell distinguished those 
“more rigorous” standards—which demanded the capacity to assist counsel—
in a footnote.58  A long-time justification for the common law prohibition on 
executing the incompetent was thus shorn. 
D. A Closer Look at Justice Powell’s Opinion 
When the Supreme Court addresses whether punishment “comports with 
the fundamental human dignity that the [Eighth] Amendment protects,” it 
considers whether the punishment was “cruel and unusual at the time that the 
Bill of Rights was adopted” and also whether it offends “‘evolving standards 
 
 54. Justice Powell articulated the standard as follows: 
If the defendant perceives the connection between his crime and his punishment, the 
retributive goal of the criminal law is satisfied.  And only if the defendant is aware that his 
death is approaching can he prepare himself for his passing.  Accordingly . . . the Eighth 
Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of [1] the punishment 
they are about to suffer and [2] why they are to suffer it. 
Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 422 n.3. 
 56. Id. at 421 (citing FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985 and Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, 
para. 1005-2-3(a) (1985) (“A person is unfit to be executed if because of a mental condition he is 
unable to understand the nature and purpose of such sentence.”); State v. Pastet, 363 A.2d 41, 49 
(Conn. 1975) (asking “whether the defendant was able to understand the nature of the sentencing 
proceedings, i.e., why he was being punished and the nature of his punishment”)). 
 57. Id. at 421–22. 
 58. Id. at 422 & n.3.  Powell explained in the footnote: 
A number of States have remained faithful to Blackstone’s view that a defendant cannot 
be executed unless he is able to assist in his own defense [citing Missouri, Mississippi, 
and Utah].  The majority of States appear not to have addressed the issue in their statutes.  
Modern case authority on this question is sparse, and while some older cases favor the 
Blackstone view, those cases largely antedate the recent expansion of both the right to 
counsel and the availability of federal and state collateral review.  Moreover, other cases 
suggest that the prevailing test is “whether the condemned man was aware of his 
conviction and the nature of his impending fate”—essentially the same test stated by 
Florida’s statute.  Under these circumstances, I find no sound basis for constitutionalizing 
the broader definition of insanity, with its requirement that the defendant be able to assist 
in his own defense. 
Id. at 422 n.3 (citations omitted). 
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of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”59  This involves an 
objective survey of society’s contemporary standards, reflected in part by 
legislative and judicial action, followed by the Court’s own analytical 
interpretation.60 
Justice Powell’s analysis is more cursory.  On the objective front, Powell’s 
argument for limiting the constitutional minimum to retribution did not tell the 
whole story.  If Powell had looked at all state laws, he would have found that a 
majority of the state courts and legislatures that had addressed the execution 
competency required the capacity to assist counsel.61  In fact, one of the two 
law review articles Powell cited documented this.62  Notably, the same author 
advocated including the capacity to assist counsel as part of the standard,63 as 
did others studying the issue at that time.64 
The take-away point is not that Justice Powell was unjustified in finding 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibition’s interest in dignity was best guided 
and measured by retribution, but rather that his justification for omitting the 
capacity to assist counsel was neither thoroughly investigated nor convincingly 
presented.  State legislative determinations to keep the capacity to assist 
counsel should not have been taken so lightly.  Justice Powell cursorily 
 
 59. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405–06 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 60. See id.; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 311–21 (2002) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01). 
 61. See supra note 38. 
 62. Note, supra note 14, at 540 (citing Hazard & Louisell, supra note 15, at 394 & n.46).  
The note author recognized that of the “few states . . . that have attempted to set a specific 
standard of insanity for this stage of the criminal justice process,” “four states include in their 
case law standards of insanity uniquely applicable to these proceedings,” id. at 541 & n.48 (New 
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania), and “[f]our other states have included a test for 
insanity for this purpose in their statutes,” id. (Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and New Jersey).  Three 
of the case law states were “understand and assist,” and Pennsylvania was neither.  Id. at 541 
n.49.  Of the statutory states, two were “understand and assist” (Missouri and New Jersey).  Id. at 
541 n. 48.  And in Illinois caselaw supported the common law rule.  See supra notes 36–40. 
 63. Note, supra note 14, at 561–62.  The authors of the other article Powell cited, finding 
ambiguity in the common law rationales, argued that the “appropriate test of insanity to be used 
[in the execution context] is one which is broad enough to allow maximum exemptions and yet 
narrow enough to prevent feigning of insanity.”  Hazard & Louisell, supra note 15, at 395.  They 
settled on a standard even broader and less detailed than Dusky: “[S]imply whether the 
defendant’s condition is such that, by ordinary standards, he would be involuntarily committable 
to an institution.”  Id. 
 64. See Larkin, supra note 14, at 794 (“Because executing the presently incompetent should 
be forbidden on the ground that it takes advantage of the prisoner’s mental disorder to foreclose 
his right to challenge his sentence, the test for present competency should focus on the prisoner’s 
competency to decide whether to exercise this right.”); see id. at 794–96 (advocating Rees v. 
Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966), as the correct test for execution incompetence). 
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decided—in dicta,65 without review by all members of the Court, and without 
taking counterarguments—that the age-old reliability interest of the 
competency determination at the time of execution was a moot point. Such a 
tenuous decision, particularly in the Eighth Amendment context demanding 
heightened reliability, and today as concerns about the execution of the 
innocent increase, ought to be followed cautiously, if at all. 
E. Justice Marshall’s Call 
Nevertheless, Justice Powell’s opinion has been followed.  Two years after 
Ford, in determining whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing 
individuals who have mental retardation, the Court noted in passing that 
“under Ford v. Wainwright, someone who is ‘unaware of the punishment they 
are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it’ cannot be executed.”66  Some 
lower courts took this as authority that Powell’s opinion articulated the 
substantive standard of Ford.67  Others viewed the Penry v. Lynaugh reference 
as dicta, but in lieu of a more formal ruling, deemed this a circumstance in 
which Supreme Court dicta controlled.68  Since Penry, no court has seriously 
considered the idea that the Eighth Amendment requires something more than 
 
 65. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (discussing 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (“Dicta are less carefully considered than 
holdings, and, therefore, less likely to be accurate statements of law.”)); Pierre N. Leval, Judging 
Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (2006) (“[C]ourts are 
more likely to exercise flawed, ill-considered judgment, more likely to overlook salutary cautions 
and contraindications, more likely to pronounce flawed rules, when uttering dicta than when 
deciding their cases.”). 
 66. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989).  Penry discussed the common law history 
of excluding the “insane” from execution, retracing the same history as the Ford plurality, and 
noted that “the common law prohibition against punishing ‘idiots’ for their crimes suggests that it 
may indeed be cruel and unusual punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or severely 
retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions.”  Id.  But 
the Court concluded that “[b]ecause of the protections afforded by the insanity defense today, 
such a person is not likely to be convicted or face the prospect of punishment.”  Id.  This 
reasoning was repudiated in Atkins v. Virginia, which declared individuals who have mental 
retardation exempt from the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.  536 U.S. 304, 321 
(2002). 
 67. See, e.g., Schornhorst v. Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 2d 944, 952 (S.D. Ind. 1999); Coe v. 
State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 209–10 (Tenn. 2000). 
 68. See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 170 n.10 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing United 
States v. Fareed, 296 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2002)); Baird v. State, 833 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Ind. 
2005).  But see id. at 34 (Boehm, J., dissenting) (finding language in Penry “is not . . . in the 
category of square holdings that are entitled to complete deference as definitive rulings of the 
Supreme Court”). 
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what Justice Powell prescribed.  In the few cases where prisoners have argued 
for capacity to assist, courts have rejected it out of hand.69 
One of the most dramatic cases in which the Penry reference effectively 
silenced counterarguments is that of Arkansas prisoner Ricky Rector.  Several 
years after Ford, mental health examiners determined that Rector understood 
that he would be executed for his crime, but “would have considerable 
difficulty due to his organic deficits in being able to work in a collaborative, 
cooperative effort with an attorney.”70  They determined that Rector, while 
perhaps not incompetent under Justice Powell’s test, “would not be able to 
recognize or understand facts which might be related to his case which might 
make his punishment unjust or unlawful.”71  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals denied Rector’s Ford claim, and in doing so held that Rector’s 
capacity to assist counsel was irrelevant.72  Rector sought relief from the 
United States Supreme Court, and the Court denied his petition. 
Dissenting from denial of certiorari, Justice Marshall objected that Ford 
had not decided whether the capacity to assist counsel was relevant under the 
Eighth Amendment, and emphasized that “lower courts clearly erred in 
viewing Ford as settling the issue”—“even Justice Powell recognized that the 
full court left the issue open.”73  Noting the prevalence and worsening of 
mental illness on death row, Marshall concluded the issue was “open” and 
 
 69. In so doing, courts have cited the doctrine from Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
193 (1977), which generally holds that in the event of a plurality opinion the narrowest holding 
rules.  Courts have also cited Marks to support Justice Powell’s opinion as precedent on Ford 
procedure.  See, e.g., Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 818 (6th Cir. 2000); Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 136 
F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (D. Ariz. 2001); see also Melissa M. Berry, Seeking Clarity in the 
Federal Habeas Fog: Determining What Constitutes “Clearly Established” Law Under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 814 (2005) (citing 
Coe’s interpretation of Ford as an example of “a habeas court invoking the Marks doctrine to find 
clearly established federal law”); cf. State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 669 n.13 (Conn. 2005) (noting 
that Ford’s plurality opinion “does not necessarily represent the governing law” on Ford 
procedure and enforcing Powell’s opinion as the substantive standard for determining 
incompetence to be executed). 
 70. Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1240 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 572–73 (8th Cir. 1991); see Rector v. Lockhart, 727 F. 
Supp. 1285, 1292 (E.D. Ark. 1990). 
 73. Rector, 501 U.S. at 1241 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The lower 
courts clearly erred in viewing Ford as settling the issue whether a prisoner can be deemed 
competent to be executed notwithstanding his inability to recognize or communicate facts 
showing his sentence to be unlawful or unjust. Although the Court in Ford did emphasize the 
injustice ‘of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and 
stripped of his fundamental right to life,’ the Court stressed that this was just one of many 
conditions that were treated as rendering a prisoner incompetent (or insane) at common law.” 
(quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986))). 
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“unsettled,” “recurring and important.”74  Rebutting Powell’s argument that the 
“advent of increased opportunities for direct and collateral review of criminal 
convictions had so reduced the possibility of undiscovered error as to render 
this conception obsolete,” Marshall stressed that if a prisoner is incompetent 
during collateral review, the proceedings cannot assuredly root out trial error, 
nor can they reliably resolve issues of innocence that would support an 
application for executive clemency: 
This view strikes me not only as inconsistent with the established principle 
“that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, 
at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered 
cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted,” but also as 
somewhat question begging.  For if a prisoner is incapable of recognizing or 
communicating facts that would facilitate collateral review, there is no reason 
to assume that collateral review in his case has rooted out all trial errors.  In 
addition, Justice Powell’s argument seems to miss at least half the point of the 
common law conception of incompetence.  This definition focuses not only on 
the prisoner’s capacity to recognize and communicate facts showing that his 
sentence is unlawful, but also on his capacity to recognize and communicate 
facts showing that his sentence is unjust.  Absent this capacity, the prisoner is 
unable to participate in efforts to seek executive clemency, the appropriateness 
of which will not necessarily be disclosed in the course of direct or collateral 
review of the prisoner’s conviction. Ultimately, then, the common law 
conception of incompetence embodies the principle that it is inhumane to put a 
man to death when he has been rendered incapable of appealing to the mercy 
of the society that has condemned him.75 
Justice Marshall is not alone.  After Ford, the American Bar Association, 
noting “concern for the integrity of the criminal justice system,” endorsed an 
“understand and assist” standard.76  The ABA has recently elaborated on 
circumstances in which concerns about a prisoner’s mental competence should 
preclude execution.77  Following Justice Marshall, Richard Bonnie argues that 
 
 74. Id. at 1243. 
 75. Id. at 1243 n.2 (citing MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.060(1) (Supp. 1991); Ford, 477 U.S. at 
420–21) (other citations omitted). 
 76. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7–5.6(b) (1989) (“A convict 
is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the convict 
cannot understand the nature of the pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason 
for the punishment, or the nature of the punishment.  A convict is also incompetent if, as a result 
of mental illness or mental retardation, the convict lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or 
understand any fact which might exist which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or 
lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or to the court.”). 
 77. ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, Recommendation and 
Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 673 (2006).  Paragraph 3(c) states that “execution should be precluded 
when a prisoner lacks the capacity . . . (ii) to assist counsel in post-conviction adjudication.”  Id.;  
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the proper scope of reference for considering a prisoner’s ability to assist 
counsel is not merely the execution but the whole of post-conviction 
proceedings.  Justice Powell, Bonnie points out, incorrectly “assum[ed] that 
prisoners on the threshold of execution have already taken advantage of these 
post-conviction opportunities, leaving little risk that some critically important 
fact has been obscured throughout these proceedings or that a previously 
unknown defect in the conviction or sentence could yet emerge.”78  In addition 
to noting that incompetence is often not seen as a basis for halting post-
conviction proceedings, Bonnie also points out that Justice Powell’s reliance 
on effective assistance of counsel does not comport with some jurisdictions’ 
failure to recognize incompetence as a basis for halting collateral review.79  
Further, states are split on whether the capacity to assist counsel should play a 
role in competence determinations during post-conviction proceedings.80 
 
accord Recommendations of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and 
Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1115, 1116 (2005) [hereinafter Task Force Recommendations] (“If a court finds at any time that a 
prisoner under sentence of death has a mental disorder or disability that significantly impairs his 
or her capacity to understand or communicate pertinent information or otherwise to assist 
counsel, in connection with post-conviction proceedings, and that the prisoner’s participation is 
necessary for a fair resolution of specific claims bearing on the validity of the conviction or death 
sentence, the court should suspend the proceedings.  If the court finds that there is no significant 
likelihood of restoring the prisoner’s capacity to participate in post-conviction proceedings in the 
foreseeable future, it should reduce the prisoner’s sentence to a lesser punishment.”). 
 78. Bonnie, supra note 7, at 1178.  In addition to advocating for including the capacity to 
assist in defense in the Ford standard, Bonnie argues that procedural bars should not apply where 
incompetence precipitated default, and that post-conviction proceedings should halt pending 
restoration of competence.  Id. at 1178–80 (“A prisoner’s inability to assist in post-conviction 
litigation must be addressed in a comprehensive manner, and not only as a possible element of the 
Eighth Amendment bar against execution of a presently incompetent person.”).  Professor 
Bonnie’s position mirrors that proposed by the ABA-IRR Task Force.  Id. at 1181.  Claims in 
which the “prisoner’s participation is necessary for a fair resolution of specific claims bearing on 
the validity of the conviction or death sentence” include those that do not involve a record-based 
trial error, such as ineffective assistance of counsel and suppression issues.  Id. 
 79. See id. at 1178 (asserting that a “prisoner’s incompetence is not ordinarily recognized as 
a basis for suspending collateral litigation”).  Bonnie suggests that with proper protections in 
place, Powell’s assumption may be valid.  Id.  But without proper protections, “[t]he possibility, 
however slim, that incompetent individuals may not be able to assist counsel in reconstructing a 
viable factual or legal claim, requires that executions be barred” where a prisoner’s incapacity to 
assist counsel warrants suspending collateral proceedings.  Id. at 1181; accord Rohan v. 
Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When collateral review is compromised by the 
petitioner’s incompetence, however, this justification [of Justice Powell’s] fails.”). 
 80. Compare Reid v. State, 197 S.W.3d 694, 702 (Tenn. 2006) (rejecting competence 
standard that would require rational communication with counsel because post-conviction right 
does not guarantee effective assistance of counsel), with People v. Owens, 564 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 
(Ill. 1990) (holding statutory right to post-conviction counsel not met when “appointed counsel 
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There are thus circumstances in which the competence of a prisoner who 
lacks the capacity to communicate a defense could go untested during 
collateral review, and in which constitutional claims, including those backed 
by evidence of innocence, will go unheard.  If this state of affairs is 
inconsistent with Eighth Amendment concerns for reliability, it is even more 
troubling if “collateral review—and judicial oversight in general—have 
subsumed many of the functions formerly performed by executive clemency at 
the time of execution.”81  Justice Marshall and Professor Bonnie may have the 
better argument.82  Regardless, the point to focus on, echoing Justice Marshall 
in Rector, is that there are reasonable points of debate that were not addressed 
in Ford and have not been since.  Prior to Panetti v. Quarterman, with Justice 
Powell’s concurrence firmly entrenched, arguments such as Justice Marshall’s 
and Professor Bonnie’s, however persuasive, held little currency. 
II.  PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN 
Justice Powell’s Ford standard left interpretative difficulties for courts.83  
A prominent “next question” was whether the standard required a “rational 
understanding” or mere “factual understanding” of the execution and its 
reason.84  This was complicated by Ford’s use of multiple terms (comprehend, 
understand, aware, know)—imperfect synonyms, themselves open to 
interpretation—to describe the applicable cognitive state.85  Some courts, 
 
cannot determine whether a post-conviction petitioner has any viable claims, because petitioner’s 
mental disease or defect renders him incapable of communicating in a rational manner”). 
 81. Rohan, 334 F.3d at 811. 
 82. James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Unfit to Live, Unfit to Die: Incompetency for 
Execution Under Modern Death Penalty Legislation, 33 CRIM. L. BULL. 107, 117 (1997). 
 83. KENT MILLER & MICHAEL RADELET, EXECUTING THE MENTALLY ILL: THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE CASE OF ALVIN FORD 139 (1993).  See generally L. Elizabeth 
Chamblee, Time For a Legislative Change: Florida’s Stagnant Standard Governing Competency 
for Execution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 335 (2004) (addressing problems with the Florida standard 
that Justice Powell endorsed in Ford). 
 84. SLOBOGIN, supra note 7, at 191.  Other interpretative questions after Ford include: What 
“manifestations of mental illness are necessary and/or sufficient for a finding of incompetence for 
execution”?  What level of proof is required for a finding of incompetence?  How should courts 
handle the prevalence of waxing and waning of a prisoner’s competence?  See MILLER & 
RADELET, supra note 83, at 105–06; Chamblee, supra note 83, at 351. 
 85. See Chamblee, supra note 83, at 351; Michael Radelet, Ethics and the Psychiatric 
Determination of Competency to Be Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 37, 38 
(1986); see also Harding, supra note 7, at 130 (critiquing use of terms “incompetency” and 
“insanity” as “archaic” and “imprecise”); John L. Farringer, Note, The Competency Conundrum: 
Problems Courts Have Faced in Applying Different Standards for Competency to Be Executed, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 2441, 2481 (2001). 
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including the Fifth Circuit, responded by focusing on the term “aware” and 
requiring only factual understanding, or mere “awareness.”86 
In Panetti, the court applied this interpretation to a person who believed, 
delusionally and adamantly, that execution was his punishment for preaching 
the gospel.87  Panetti saw his execution as a chapter in an age-old interplay 
between God and the devil.  This was not a new development.  In years prior, 
he engaged in paranoid acts designed to thwart what he perceived as the devil’s 
efforts to kill him, and expressed similar fears while representing himself at 
trial.88  None of the six psychiatric experts who examined Panetti’s 
competence for execution disputed the fixed nature of Panetti’s delusional 
belief that execution was a consequence of religious warfare, rather than 
criminal law.89  To the Fifth Circuit, however, Panetti was competent simply 
because prison officials told him his execution was punishment for murdering 
his ex-wife’s parents.  The court dismissed the evidence of delusions as beside 
the point.90 
 
 86. The Fifth Circuit initially followed both Ford opinions, but by 1994 “ha[d] adopted the 
standard as enunciated by Justice Powell as the Ford standard.”  Barnard v. Collins, 13 F.3d 871, 
876 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994); see Garrett v. Collins, 951 F.2d 57, 59 (5th Cir. 1992) (looking to both 
the majority and concurring opinions in Ford and finding, under both, that the prisoner’s belief 
that he would be saved by his aunt prior to execution did not render him incompetent to be 
executed); Lowenfield v. Butler, 843 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1988).  A likely reason for the court’s 
switch was the reference to Powell’s Ford opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 
(1989). 
 87. See Brief for Petitioner at 18–28, Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2842 
(2007) (No. 06-6407).  Firmly held delusions, often of grandeur or persecution such as those 
Panetti suffered, and other perceptual and thought disorders are core elements of the clinical 
definition of schizophrenia.  See NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., SCHIZOPHRENIA 3 (NIH Publication No. 3517 2004) (“Delusions are false 
personal beliefs that are not part of the person’s culture and do not change, even when other 
people present proof that the beliefs are not true and logical.”); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1999) (“Delusions are firmly 
held erroneous beliefs due to distortions or exaggerations of reasoning and/or misinterpretations 
of perceptions or experiences.”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF 
MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS: DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR RESEARCH 1187 (1993) 
(defining delusions as “false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning and that are idiosyncratic 
for the patient”); Robert Cancro & Heinz E. Lehmann, Schizophrenia: Clinical Features, in 1 
KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1187–89 (Benjamin J. 
Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000).  For a discussion of the intersection between 
severe mental illness and capital punishment proceedings, see Ronald S. Honberg, The Injustice 
of Imposing Death Sentences on People with Severe Mental Illnesses, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1153, 
1159–64 (2005) (focusing on Panetti). 
 88. See Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2848; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 87, at 8–18; Honberg, 
supra note 87, at 1163–64. 
 89. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 87, at 18–28. 
 90. See Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider 
“whether the Eighth Amendment permits the execution of a prisoner whose 
mental illness deprives him of ‘the mental capacity to understand that [he] is 
being executed as a punishment for a crime.’”91  Writing for a five-Justice 
majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized that no language in Ford, no rationale 
mentioned therein, and no common law history supported a standard like the 
Fifth Circuit’s, which made evidence of a prisoner’s severe delusions collateral 
to the competency determination.92  Looking to Justice Marshall’s opinion and 
Justice Powell’s, the Court recognized that neither “indicate[s] that delusions 
are irrelevant to ‘comprehen[sion]’ or ‘aware[ness]’ if they so impair the 
prisoner’s concept of reality that he cannot reach understanding of the reason 
for the execution.”93  “If anything,” the Court noted, referring to Justice 
Marshall’s opinion, “the Ford majority suggests the opposite.”94 
Noting that to ignore evidence of delusions “mistak[es] Ford’s holding and 
its logic,” the Court explained why delusions are relevant to assessing 
retribution,95 and “under similar logic [to] the other rationales set forth by 
Ford”96: 
 
 91. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2859 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 87, at 31).  The 
Court’s opinion in Panetti addressed two issues in addition to the substantive Ford standard.  A 
jurisdictional issue concerned the propriety of the Court’s review of the case under the AEDPA 
provision 28 U.S.C. § 2244, which bars federal review of “second or successive habeas corpus 
applications.”  Id. at 2865.  Panetti had not raised a Ford claim in his first federal habeas petition.  
The State argued that § 2244 foreclosed the claim.  Id. at 2852.  Panetti responded that the claim 
was timely because it was promptly presented when ripe, after denial of certiorari by the United 
States Supreme Court on the first federal petition.  The Court agreed: requiring prisoners to file 
unripe Ford claims, the Court reasoned, would be an “empty formality.”  Id. at 2854–55 
(distinguishing Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998)).  The Court also addressed 
the procedures required by Ford and found that Panetti “made a ‘substantial threshold showing of 
insanity,’” entitling him to a fair hearing and an opportunity to be heard.  Id. at 2856 (quoting 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 426 (1986)).  At minimum, the Court held, this required an 
opportunity to rebut state expert opinion.  Id. at 2858.  The state court, failing to so provide, 
unreasonably applied law clearly established in Ford.  Id. at 2855.  The federal district court held, 
in addition, that the egregious procedural failures by the state court—made prominent by the 
diligent motion practice of Panetti’s counsel throughout—fell short of what Ford requires.  See 
Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (W.D. Tex. 2004).  See generally Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 
at 2859–62. 
 92. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862. 
 93. Id. at 2861 (second and third alterations in original); see id. at 2860 (“‘[A]wareness’ . . . 
is not necessarily synonymous with ‘rational understanding.’”). 
 94. Id. at 2861. 
 95. Id. (“The potential for a prisoner’s recognition of the severity of the offense and the 
objective of community vindication are called in question . . . if the prisoner’s mental state is so 
distorted by a mental illness that his awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no 
relation to the understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole.”). 
 96. Id. 
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Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an 
awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far 
removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.  It is 
therefore error to derive from Ford, and the substantive standard for 
incompetency its opinions broadly identify, a strict test for competency that 
treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State has 
identified the link between his crime and the punishment to be inflicted.97 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion views delusions as part of the inquiry into whether a 
prisoner has a “rational understanding.”  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit’s test—
which stopped after asking if a prisoner is (1) aware of committing the 
underlying crime, (2) aware he will be executed, and (3) aware that the reason 
the state has given for the execution is the underlying crime98—was  
“improperly restrictive” and a “flawed interpretation of Ford.”99  Finding 
“much in the record to support the conclusion that [Panetti] suffers from severe 
delusions,”100 the Court reversed the judgment and remanded. 
The following sections focus on the Court’s interpretation of the two 
primary opinions in Ford, Justice Marshall’s and Justice Powell’s—and how 
the Court draws from both the meaning of the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
on executing individuals with the severe mental illness. 
A. Revitalization of the Ford Plurality 
On the substantive standard, Ford precedent has always stood in a curious 
posture, because the issue was not directly before the Court.  True, the Court’s 
one-line reference in Penry to Justice Powell’s concurrence led many courts to 
anoint Powell’s model and its reasoning.  But Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court in Panetti gives an unmistakably different meaning to Ford.  For the 
Panetti majority, neither opinion in Ford offers a “strict test” of what 
constitutes incompetence to be executed.  Both opinions broadly discuss the 
same territory.  One opinion is more specific than the other on the substantive 
standard, but neither opinion presents a rule.  Rather, the Ford opinions 
identify principles: “[T]he opinions in Ford did not set forth a precise 
standard”; and “the principles set forth in Ford are put at risk by [the Fifth 
Circuit’s] rule.”101 
If Panetti grants prominence to any portion of Ford in setting forth these 
principles, it is arguably Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court—the 
“controlling portion” or “majority” portion of Marshall’s opinion that Justice 
Powell joined.  The Court twice quotes the “controlling portion” of Marshall’s 
 
 97. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862. 
 98. See id. at 2860. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2859–60. 
 101. Id. at 2861. 
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opinion.  The first is Marshall’s statement that “we may seriously question the 
retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he 
has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.”  The second 
follows the Court’s assertion that “the Ford opinions nowhere indicate that 
delusions are irrelevant to ‘comprehen[sion]’ or ‘aware[ness].’”102 “If 
anything,” Justice Kennedy continues, “the Ford majority suggests the 
opposite.”103  The Court concludes that “Justice Marshall in the controlling 
portion of his opinion set forth various rationales,” and that the Fifth Circuit 
test is not consistent with any of them.104  Finally, attributing parity to the 
rationales as well as to Ford’s dual opinions, the Court, after finding that the 
retributive purpose is “not necessarily overcome once the test set forth by the 
Court of Appeals is met,” adds that “under a similar logic the other rationales 
set forth by Ford [also] fail to align with the distinctions drawn by the Court of 
Appeals.”105 
The focus in Panetti is on unity.  Both Ford opinions endorse the same 
general standard—a prisoner must “rationally understand” he will be killed by 
the state as punishment for a crime.  Both Ford opinions articulate Eighth 
Amendment principles and rationales for courts to follow.  After Panetti, the 
retributive questions asked by Justice Powell are not necessarily—and ought 
no longer be presumptively—the only ones that matter.106 
B. A Telling Application of the Marks Doctrine 
Panetti’s revitalization of Ford is foretold in the Court’s application of the 
Marks doctrine.107  The Marks doctrine, spurred in the late 1970s, in part by 
the development of Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence and the 
divisiveness of the death penalty,108 generally holds that in the event of a 
 
 102. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2861 (alterations in original). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2861–62. 
 107. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 108. Id. at 193 (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining 
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .’” (quoting the response of the plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), to the Court’s splintered decision 
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972))).  For a discussion of Marks in the context of federal 
capital habeas litigation under the AEDPA (as in Panetti), see Berry, supra note 69, at 813–14 
(discussing (1) the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Richmond v. Polk, 375 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2004), 
which interprets as controlling precedent Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Simmons v. 
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 175 (1994) and (2) the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Justice 
Powell’s Ford concurrence on the procedural issue in Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2000)).  
See also United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 890 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying Marks to find 
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plurality opinion, the narrowest holding controls.109  While the appropriate 
scope of the doctrine is disputed,110 it is generally agreed that Marks works 
when separate opinions in the same case clearly agree on some “lowest 
common denominator” and clearly state a rule.111  Since Ford, lower courts 
 
that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000), 
governs the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “parole eligibility” under Simmons); O’Dell v. 
Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1224 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying Marks to find that Justice White’s 
concurring opinion in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), which held that reliance on 
“secret” information in imposing a death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, constitutes the 
holding), aff’d, 521 U.S. 151 (1997) (applying but not explicitly adopting Justice White’s view). 
 109. Consternation with the potential for paradoxical and irrational results in cases lacking a 
majority opinion has increased, along with plurality decisions, over the last half-century.  See Ken 
Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
1593, 1593 n.3 (1992) (offering statistical evidence of the increase in plurality decisions during 
the twentieth century); Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the 
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419 (1992) [hereinafter 
When the Court Divides]; Mark Alan Thurmon, Plurality Decisions and Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1981); see also John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, 
Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59; Lewis A. 
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993); Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality 
Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980); Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority 
Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1956). 
 110. Critics have argued that Marks is unworkable because it does not apply logically in all 
situations.  An oft-cited criticism is that “in situations where the various opinions supporting the 
judgment are mutually exclusive, Marks will turn a single opinion that lacks majority support into 
national law.”  King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see United States v. 
Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Marks is workable . . . only when one 
opinion is the logical subset of other, broader opinions.”); see, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 
404 (1972) (“illegitimate plurality”).  Another common criticism is that a “narrowest holding” 
rule offends the principle of majoritarianism.  See Kimura, supra note 108, at 1604 (“The 
narrowest grounds model is inconsistent with the principle of majoritarianism.”).  Some 
commentators have urged, however, that Marks has a fundamental place in contemporary 
constitutional law, and would include it in the core curriculum or “canon.”  See Maxwell Stears, 
The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. 
COMMENT. 321 (2000); accord When the Court Divides, supra note 108, at 441–42 (“When the 
Supreme Court fails to follow the result predicted by the Marks rule, it overrules a precedent, at 
least from the perspective of the lower courts, which must attempt to follow all of the High 
Court’s decisions, even its plurality decisions.”). 
 111. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994).  For example, in Kennedy v. 
Dugger, 933 F.2d 905, 915–16 & n.18 (11th Cir. 1991), the court, interpreting Walton v. Arizona, 
497 U.S. 639 (1990), applied Marks to find that the plurality opinion, which approved of an 
Arizona statute requiring defendants to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the 
evidence, was narrower than Justice Scalia’s opinion, which disapproved of the line of cases 
establishing the right to present mitigating circumstances, and is therefore controlling.  Accord 
Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A 
Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 
130 (2007). 
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have applied Marks to enforce Justice Powell’s Ford opinion as precedent on 
procedure and on the substantive standard for competence to be executed.112  
Panetti, however, does not apply Marks across the board.  The Court relies on 
Marks when ruling on Ford’s procedural requirements, but in marked contrast, 
the Court does not invoke Marks when it discusses Ford’s substantive 
standard. 
On procedure, Justice Kennedy applies Marks to hold that Justice Powell’s 
opinion, which “offered a more limited holding,” constitutes “clearly 
established federal law” and “sets the minimum procedures a State must 
provide to a prisoner raising a Ford-based competency claim.”113  Articulating 
Powell’s position in detail, the Court notes that it demands, upon a “substantial 
threshold showing of insanity,” a “fair hearing” inclusive of more than merely 
the “examinations performed by state-appointed psychiatrists.”114 The Ford 
majority, by contrast, is sidelined by the Marks rule. The Court mentions 
Justice Marshall’s more general statements on procedure once at the outset, but 
not again. 
Panetti’s approach to the substantive standard is palpably different.  
Whereas the Court cements Powell’s concurrence as controlling on procedure, 
the Court finds that Powell’s opinion on substance is “more specific,” but 
points out that both opinions were broad, and then emphasizes that Powell 
wrote alone: “The opinions in Ford, it must be acknowledged, did not set forth 
a precise standard for competency.  The four-Justice plurality discussed the 
substantive standard at a high level of generality; and Justice Powell wrote 
only for himself when he articulated more specific criteria.”115  Throughout the 
discussion of the substantive standard, the Marks rule is never mentioned.  
Rather, having acknowledged early on that a “substantive federal baseline for 
competency [was] set down in Ford,” the Court jointly cites to Justice 
Marshall’s declaration that the Eighth Amendment prevents execution of “one 
whose mental illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the 
penalty or its implications” and to Justice Powell’s assertion that the Eighth 
Amendment “forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the 
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it”—
concluding, without choosing between the two articulations, that “[w]hether 
Ford’s inquiry into competency is formulated as a question of the prisoner’s 
 
 112. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 113. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. at 2842, 2856 (2007) (“Under this rule 
Justice Powell’s opinion constitutes ‘clearly established’ law for purposes of § 2254 and sets the 
minimum procedures a State must provide to a prisoner raising a Ford-based competency 
claim.”) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)); cf. State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 669 n.13 (Conn. 
2005) (questioning the force of Powell’s opinion on procedure under the Marks doctrine). 
 114. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2856. 
 115. Id. at 2860. 
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ability to ‘comprehen[d] the reasons’ for his punishment or as a determination 
into whether he is ‘unaware of . . . why [he is] to suffer it,’” the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach “is inconsistent with Ford.”116 
The Court does not explain this polarity.  It may be that the Court 
implicitly relies on a practical exception to the Marks rule: where the Court’s 
statement on an issue is not clear, where there is no clear rule, the Marks 
doctrine is moot.117  That only the procedural issue, not the substantive issue, 
was properly before the Court in Ford supports this interpretation.  So does the 
fact that Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court performed an “evolving 
standards of decency” analysis with regard to the prohibition’s existence, but 
not its scope.118  Significantly, Panetti shows that Justice Powell’s opinion 
does not preclude the Eighth Amendment review that Justice Marshall sought.  
After Panetti, it seems a court would be remiss to apply Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Ford without taking into account Justice Marshall’s as well, 
including its focus on multiple common law rationales for the prohibition.119 
 
 116. Id. at 2848, 2861 (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 
407 U.S. 399, 417, 422 (1986)). 
 117. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994).  In Nichols, the Court 
chose not to apply Marks in response to disagreement among lower court interpretations, evincing 
a lack of definitive statement in the precedent.  Id.  More recently in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003), the Court took the same path, finding widespread disagreement among courts 
over whether Justice Powell’s opinion’s “diversity rationale” was binding under Marks.  Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 325.  Citing Nichols, the Court avoided the issue, but endorsed Powell’s view 
nevertheless.  Id. at 325–26.  Compare Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745–46 (“We think it not useful to 
pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and 
divided the lower courts that have considered it.”), and Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (same), with 
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6, 9 (1994) (applying Marks to identify Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), as controlling). 
 118. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986). 
 119. Justice Thomas’s dissent in Panetti argues that Ford provides no precedent on the 
substantive standard because the case did not present the issue.  The Ford plurality, he argues, 
“did not define insanity or create a substantive standard for determining competency.”  Panetti, 
127 S. Ct. at 2873–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  He suggests that “Justice Marshall’s plurality 
opinion in Ford did not even go so far as to state that there should be a uniform substantive 
standard for insanity.  It is thus an open question as to how much discretion the states have in 
setting the substantive standard for insanity.”  Id. at 2873 n.11.  “Only Justice Powell’s 
concurrence set[s] forth a standard,” Thomas asserts.  Yet even Justice Powell’s standard does not 
apply to Panetti, according to Thomas, because Ford broached only the question of “actual 
knowledge.”  Id. at 2873 (“[N]othing in any of the Ford opinions addresses what to do when a 
prisoner knows the reason for his execution but does not ‘rationally understand’ it.”).  For 
Thomas, neither the plurality nor concurring opinions in Ford govern. 
  Justice Thomas correctly draws attention to an interpretation of Ford that is different 
from what most lower courts accept.  But his assertion that Panetti is factually distinguishable 
from Ford because the latter concerns only “knowledge” is not accurate—Ford had been 
informed of his execution, but delusionally believed that the execution would not occur.  
Additionally, the suggestion that there is no need for a uniform substantive standard ignores the 
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C. Parting Words 
Panetti ends with an oblique word of guidance.  Urging courts adjudicating 
Ford claims to look to the opinions of physicians, psychiatrists, and other 
experts to “clarify the extent to which severe delusions may render a subject’s 
perception of reality so distorted that he should be deemed incompetent,”120 the 
Court directs attention to its recent decisions in Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. 
Virginia as “precedent to guide a court conducting Eighth Amendment 
analysis.”121  The different context of the former cases, which analyze the 
proportionality of capital punishment to a defendant’s conduct and status at the 
time of the crime and at trial, makes this tough advice.122  One interpretation is 
that the Court is leaving a broad definition of the exempt class for the states to 
apply as in Atkins, and before that in Ford.  But it may also be that the Court’s 
statement alludes to similarities between people with mental retardation 
(Atkins), juveniles (Simmons), and people with severe mental illness.  In 
Atkins, as the Court exempted individuals with mental retardation from the 
death penalty, it identified—as a core reason—the inability of those individuals 
to “give meaningful assistance to their counsel.”123 
Panetti’s parting advice, like the opinion’s reasoning, suggests that it is 
time for courts to consider and determine whether “evolving standards of 
decency” demand that a prisoner have the capacity to assist counsel before the 
state carries out an execution.  It is time to answer Justice Marshall’s call and 
attend to this “open,” “unsettled,” “recurring,” and “important”124 issue. 
III.  FORD AFTER PANETTI 
Today, most states—but not all—do limit the Ford inquiry to Powell’s 
scope.125  But as the previous section describes, this state of affairs is not 
 
danger of arbitrary applications across jurisdictions and the Eighth Amendment basis of the Ford 
right. 
 120. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2863; cf. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 781 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 121. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2863 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–64 (2005); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–14 (2002); Ford, 477 U.S. at 406–10). 
 122. Bonnie, supra note 9, at 280. 
 123. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21 (“Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give 
meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may 
create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes . . . .  Mentally retarded 
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.”). 
 124. Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1243 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 125. Courts in two states have moved since Ford to require the capacity to assist counsel for 
execution competence.  See Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993); State v. Harris, 789 
P.2d 60, 66 (Wash. 1990).  And at least four other states continue to incorporate the capacity to 
assist counsel as an element of the determination by statute or common law.  See MISS. CODE 
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entirely rooted in reasoned choice.  For more than fifteen years, judicial and 
legislative decisions on execution competence have been made with the 
understanding that Justice Powell’s articulation was a rule.  Before meaningful 
objective analysis of the states’ positions can occur, therefore, state courts and 
legislatures must have time to respond to Panetti, reconsider what Ford and the 
Eighth Amendment require, and adjust execution competence standards 
accordingly.126 
Discussion of the substance of the matter, however, need not wait.  In a 
forum where the operative reasons and rationales for demanding execution 
competence are open to discussion, two questions are likely to arise early in 
the conversation: (1) what rationales other than the retributive rationale should 
hold force?; and (2) why should they hold force? Asked differently, why the 
retributive rationale, and why are the two questions that Justice Powell 
assigned for the standard not enough? 
The rationale I have chosen to focus on here, with Justice Marshall’s 
dissent in Rector as a touchstone, is the capacity to assist counsel.  This is not 
the only rationale given new life by Panetti: notably, respect for the dignity of 
the condemned has also lost its place, as has the rationale that a prisoner should 
be able to prepare spiritually for execution.127  After Panetti, courts need to 
reconsider the importance of these factors to the constitutional standard. 
The capacity to assist counsel is significant because it protects the dignity 
of the condemned and does so with additional purpose.  The arguments that 
Justice Marshall set forth in Rector for reliability of judgments and legitimacy 
of clemency determinations appear even stronger today, as concerns with 
innocence increase—four Justices have already suggested a need for courts to 
look to matters of reliability under the Eighth Amendment with greater care.128  
 
ANN. § 99-19-57(2)(b) (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 552.060(1) (2002); In re Smith, 176 P. 819, 
819, 823–24 (N.M. 1918); Fisher v. State, 845 P.2d 1272, 1276 n.3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) 
(applying 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1175.1 to execution context).  Illinois, one of the states Justice 
Powell looked to in Ford, has since repealed and not yet replaced the statute Powell relied on.  
People v. Johnson, 730 N.E.2d 1107, 1115 (Ill. 2000) (“[730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2-3 
(West 1992)] governed hearings on a defendant’s fitness to be executed . . . .  Our legislature, 
however, has since repealed section 5-2-3 (see Pub. Act 88-350, eff. January 1, 1994), and has not 
adopted a statutory provision delineating procedures for raising and determining fitness for 
execution, or for determining fitness for post-conviction proceedings.”). 
 126. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2675 (2008) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“State legislatures, for more than 30 years, have operated under the ominous shadows 
of the Coker dicta and thus have not been free to express their own understanding of our society’s 
standards of decency.”); see also Simmons, 543 U.S. at 551, 564–68 (discussing development in 
state law underlying the Court’s “evolving standards of decency” assessment). 
 127. See Bonnie, supra note 9, at 276–81; see generally Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the 
Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1988). 
 128. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207–11 (2006) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
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Further, there is reason to question whether a merely retributive-based standard 
is effective.  The difficulties courts have had applying Ford according to 
Powell’s formulation are likely to continue after Panetti and yield additional 
reasons to reconsider a solely retributive approach.  It may be that reinstating 
the capacity to assist counsel would protect the reliability of judgments and 
add more certainty (less arbitrariness) to a determination that, as courts and 
commentators have long recognized, is problematically moral. 
A. The Same Hard Questions 
Panetti unified, linguistically and conceptually, the hoard of terms that 
Ford left behind into one concept: “rational understanding.”  It put an end to 
competence assessments based on mere awareness and flushed out 
incompetence claims rooted in mere desire to thwart the state.129  Yet 
interpretive problems remain.  Hard questions still attend a determination of 
whether a prisoner understands the nature and effect of the punishment and its 
reason.  Which delusions matter and why?  How do they matter and how 
much?130 
One predicament also troubled the district court in Ford.  The district court 
on remand in Ford applied the same Florida standard that Justice Powell said 
would exempt Ford from execution if his factual assertions proved true, but 
denied relief.131  The court was troubled, not by the severity of Alvin Ford’s 
symptoms, which were extreme, but by their ebb and flow—a defining feature 
 
 129. The Court’s opinion in Panetti responds to the fear, held by many, that death row 
prisoners fake insanity to avoid execution.  The validity of such claims is questionable.  See, e.g., 
Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row 
Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 841 (1986) (finding that a strong 
majority of death row inmates minimized rather than exaggerated symptoms of mental illness).  
But concerns persist, as evidenced in Justice Thomas’s dissent in Panetti, which reiterates those 
expressed twenty years before.  See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Thompson v. State, 134 S.W.3d 168, 176 
(Tenn. 2004) (voicing similar concerns); Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 269 (Tenn. 1999) 
(same).  Panetti explains that a rational understanding-based standard monitors malingering by 
demanding that courts look at delusions: under Panetti, only a lack of rational understanding 
rooted in a “psychotic disorder” is relevant.  Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 
2842, 2862 (2007); see Bonnie, supra note 9, at 281–82 (doubting “significant risk of fabrication” 
or “exaggerated symptoms” under “rational understanding” test). 
 130. The Court cited lack of record development (due to the restrictiveness of the Fifth 
Circuit’s test) as a reason for not articulating the standard in greater detail, noting hesitance to 
rule on Panetti’s competence where lower courts had not addressed “the nature and severity of 
petitioner’s alleged mental problems” “in a more definitive manner.”  Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2863. 
 131. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).  The Florida standard required a 
“rational understanding.” See Provenzano v. State, 750 So.2d 597, 601–02 (Fla. 1999) (holding 
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.811, which Florida adopted in 1986 after the Court’s decision in Ford, 
requires “rational understanding”).  But see Martin v. State, 515 So.2d 189, 189–90 (Fla. 1987) 
(implying statute does not require “rational understanding”). 
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of the delusions symptomatic of schizophrenia.132  How to measure symptoms 
that come one day and go the next is a sensitive determination.133  In Ford, the 
district court rejected the argument that it would be nearly impossible to fake 
the symptoms over a period of years, and found Ford competent.  Before the 
court of appeals ruled on the issue, Ford died in prison.134  More recently, the 
governor of Virginia addressed this problem by calling for an additional 
competence determination, and after the prisoner, Percy Walton, was found 
incompetent under Ford, waited eighteen months to see if he recovered.135  
When Walton did not, the governor commuted Walton’s sentence to life.136 
Thompson v. State137 presents another challenge.  There, courts tried to 
untangle a prisoner’s delusional beliefs involving capital sentencing 
proceedings and the concept of mitigating evidence.138  Three mental health 
experts reported that Gregory Thompson had schizophrenia and was 
incompetent to be executed;139 the same experts, however, stated that 
Thompson was aware of his impending execution and that it was for murder.140  
This involved more than a discrepancy between factual awareness and rational 
understanding.  Integrated in Thompson’s delusions that he was a Navy 
lieutenant, a Grammy award winner, and the owner of a million dollars in gold 
bars was his belief in this “evidence” as powerful mitigation that would 
 
 132. See generally MILLER & RADELET, supra note 83, at 148–57 (discussing the district 
court hearing). 
 133. See, e.g., Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 200–03 (Tenn. 2000).  A psychiatrist who 
evaluated Coe four times found him incompetent the first time, competent the second, 
incompetent the third (this occurred on the morning after the second, and Coe did not remember 
the doctor’s previous visit), and competent the fourth.  Id. at 202.  Noting that Coe’s competence 
deviated from day to day, he diagnosed Coe as suffering from schizophrenia and multiple 
personality disorder.  Id.  The doctor stated that Coe lied to him, was manipulative, and had also 
lied to other mental health professionals in the past, but found Coe’s symptoms genuine.  Id.; see 
Provenzano v. State, 760 So.2d 137, 140 (Fla. 2000) (“Provenzano suffers from mental illness, 
but because he also exaggerates symptoms and utilizes deception, it is difficult to determine 
Provenzano’s exact mental status.”). 
 134. MILLER & RADELET, supra note 83, at 155, 158. 
 135. Jerry Markon, Kaine Gives Murderer Life, Calls Inmate Mentally Unfit, WASH. POST, 
June 10, 2008, at B1. 
 136. Id. 
 137. 134 S.W.3d 168 (Tenn. 2004), aff’d sub nom., Thompson v. Bell, No. 1:04-CV-177, 
2006 WL 1195892, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 4, 2006). 
 138. Id. at 180. 
 139. Id. at 180–83; Thompson, 2006 WL 1195892, at *7–8. 
 140. Thompson, 2006 WL 1195892, at *8–9.  Prior to Panetti, Tennessee determined, like the 
Fifth Circuit, that “a prisoner need only be aware of the ‘fact of his or her execution and the 
reason for it’ to satisfy the competency required for execution of the death sentence.” Thompson, 
134 S.W.3d at 184 (citing Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 220 (Tenn. 2000)); see Van Tran v. State, 
6 S.W.3d 257, 265–66 (Tenn. 1999). 
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eventually lead to his exoneration before a military sentencing tribunal.141  One 
might think this supports a finding of incompetence.142  But to the district 
court, the delusions pertaining to mitigating factors, which Thompson hoped 
would result in a new trial, proved his competence because they showed that 
he understood the proceedings and the impending execution.143  Substituting 
rational understanding for mere awareness does not untangle this knot, in 
which understanding the execution and its reason animates the delusional 
belief.144 
B. Some Remedy 
One goal for a constitutional standard for execution competence should be 
to ameliorate difficulties such as those identified in Ford and Thompson.  Since 
Ford, some scholars have argued that a more definite articulation would make 
Ford determinations easier and more consistent.145  Certainly, Panetti does not 
endorse this, and Justice Marshall reasoned against it in similar circumstances.  
Marshall wrote in Powell v. Texas that “formulating a constitutional rule [in 
insanity cases] would reduce if not eliminate that fruitful experimentation, and 
 
 141. Thompson, 2006 WL 1195892, at *10, *24.  In another twist, although Thompson 
acknowledged his involvement in the murder, he simultaneously believes the victim is still alive.  
Id. at *10–11, *13; see id. at *13 (recognizing Thompson’s delusional belief that electrocution 
would not kill him and that there is a two-year window in which he would stay alive after 
execution). 
 142. See Bonnie, supra note 9, at 280 (stating Thompson’s beliefs are attributable to severe 
mental illness, “not . . . wishful thinking”). 
 143. Thompson, 2006 WL 1195892, at *15–17 (“Thompson’s delusions do not consist of a 
perception that he did not commit murder or that he did not receive the death sentence for the 
murder, but rather, his delusions pertain to circumstances he claims will result in him being 
awarded a new trial and sentencing hearing.” (emphasis added)); accord Thompson, 134 S.W.3d 
at 183 (finding Thompson aware of the execution and its reason, “despite any delusions”). 
 144. Panetti also fails to address what impact beliefs about the afterlife should have in 
assessing whether a prisoner understands that execution will result in his death.  See, e.g., Walton 
v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 176 n.19 (4th Cir. 2006) (“That a person believes that he will have an 
‘afterlife,’ however strange his views of that ‘afterlife’ may be, necessarily suggests he believes 
his existing life will end.”).  The Walton decision comports with the idea that a prisoner who 
holds a rational understanding of execution and rational belief in the afterlife can experience the 
retributive impact of execution.  See Bonnie, supra note 9, at 278–79 (discussing Walton). 
 145. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.  Some have argued for a categorical Ford 
exemption for a defined class of severely mentally ill.  See, e.g., Harding, supra note 7, at 134 
(seeking a “uniform standard” for deciding when a “severe mental impairment” triggers Ford’s 
protection).  One difficulty with identifying a diagnosis as the measure is the likelihood of 
overinclusion and underinclusion: for example, all patients diagnosed with schizophrenia may not 
lack the ability to understand their situation and assist counsel and some other prisoners may.  
RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 20–21 (1980); see id. 
at 70 (“There is no compelling or empirical basis for establishing . . . a relationship between 
formal psychiatric diagnosis and [legal] competency.”). 
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freeze the developing productive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a 
rigid constitutional mold.”146 Such prudence accords with Ford and Panetti 
setting forth broad principles, but no rule. 
The capacity to assist counsel is a better alternative, and one that could 
prove helpful in navigating the subtleties so problematic in a case like 
Thompson.  This capacity, which carries with it the ability to reason 
sufficiently to consult with counsel and communicate relevant information, is 
part of what the competence standards in Dusky and Godinez mean by 
“rational understanding.”147  Competence in these contexts focuses on three 
overlapping capacities: a capacity to understand the proceedings, a capacity to 
appreciate the consequences, and a capacity to assist counsel and participate in 
the legal process or communicate a defense.148  The latter is shown in the 
ability to “respond to counsel’s inquiries in a manner that provides relevant 
information for defense.”149  By contrast, the retributive questions from Ford 
focus only on the capacities to understand the proceedings and appreciate the 
consequences, which translate in the execution context to whether a prisoner 
understands that he will die via the execution, because of his crime.  Removing 
the capacity to assist counsel (and thus to communicate a defense) creates an 
artificial division between the overlapping capacities, one that needlessly 
dismisses information about the client’s interaction that is elsewhere deemed 
instrumental to a valid competence assessment.150 
 
 146. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536–37 (1968); see Note, supra note 14, at 562 n.169 
(“The Supreme Court itself is unlikely to mandate a uniform test of insanity.”). 
 147. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 148. See THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS 84 (2d ed. 2003); POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 29, at 46–47. 
 149. GRISSO, supra note 148, at 84. 
 150. See POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 29, at 47, 102–03 (discussing the need to include all 
three overlapping but incongruous capacities in the competence construct).  The way a person 
interacts with society is part of what defines mental illness—the concept is as “cultural” as it is 
“scientific.”  SLOBOGIN, supra note 7, at 5.  Perceiving environment, viewing how a person 
interacts, attains objectivity that we can never have of a person’s or patient’s inner workings.  See 
GRISSO, supra note 148, at 34 (“[B]ehavior often is best understood as an interaction between 
personal consistencies in behavioral or cognitive functioning and characteristics of the settings in 
which a person functions.”).   Legal competence “focus[es] on person-context interactions.”  Id. at 
23, 32 (citing six common features of all competency assessments:  functional abilities (abilities 
relevant for the legal competency in question); context (situation in which competency must be 
demonstrated); causal inference (nature of the relationship between the observed deficits and the 
legal ability); interaction (between person’s particular abilities and specific demands of the 
situation); judgment (determination by legal decision maker whether the person-situation 
incongruence is sufficient to warrant a finding of incompetency); and disposition (legal response 
to individual authorized by decision maker’s finding)); see Heilbrun, supra note 38, at 386 
(summarizing these questions in the execution context as “what ‘functional abilities’ are 
necessary to be competent for execution; what must the individual be able to do, know or feel”). 
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Both Thompson and Ford involved prisoners with severe mental illness 
who arguably had a rational understanding of the execution and its reason, yet 
suffered from delusions serious enough for society to wonder whether any 
retributive function is served by executing them.  No longer bound by the four 
corners of Justice Powell’s concurrence, we can see it misses something that is 
integral to Dusky.  It was said shortly before Ford that competence for 
execution may be “more insoluble” than trial competencies simply “because it 
forces us to confront directly the ultimately moral question of when the state 
may properly take life as punishment.”151  The capacity to assist counsel 
provides a well-known measure of mental acuity that, if not perfect,152 
nevertheless could help to promote consistency and reliability in Ford 
determinations. 
C. Innocence and Reliability 
An age-old concern with competence and executions is not only that the 
state might kill a prisoner who is mad beyond retributive effect or beyond the 
reach of religion—but also that the state might kill a prisoner who has severe 
mental illness yet is innocent and unable to identify exculpatory evidence and 
communicate the reasons why the evidence matters.  Seen through a 
contemporary lens, the issue has an obvious connection with the finality of 
judgments: at some point, the criminal justice system must be satisfied that 
enough review has been done to solidify confidence in the verdict, once and 
 
 151. Ward, supra note 14, at 100. 
 152. For general criticism of Dusky and Godinez, see GRISSO, supra note 148, at 10–11 
(listing critiques of Dusky test); SLOBOGIN, supra note 7, at 188–92 (analyzing ambiguity in 
Godinez extension of Dusky).  Tension continues between the need for an “open-textured” 
construct responsive to the context of a given case, see GRISSO, supra note 148, at 22 (“[T]he 
law’s definitions for legal competencies provide broad discretion in determining whether a set of 
case facts satisfies the criteria for competence or incompetence.” (citing James Gordley, Legal 
Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 CAL. L. REV. 138, 142 (1984))), and assessment instruments 
designed to make competence determinations more consistent across cases, see Bruce J. Winick, 
Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Reply to 
Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 619–20 (1995) (“[T]he assessment 
instruments, by listing a broad range of abilities, encourage clinical evaluators to apply a 
generalized, abstract standard of competency, rather than a more appropriate contextualized 
approach.”); see also POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 29, at 2; Bonnie, supra note 29, at 550.  For 
other recent critical analysis, see, for example, Grant H. Morris, Ansar M. Haroun & David 
Naimark, Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POLICY 193 (2004); 
Susan Stefan, Race, Competence Testing, and Disability Law: A Review of the MacArthur 
Competence Research, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 31, 31 (1996) (urging MacArthur Studies to 
“focus more on race, gender, and class issues in the determination of incompetence”).  For a 
critique from the perspective of counsel representing a capital client, see John T. Philipsborn, 
Searching for Uniformity in Adjudications of the Accused’s Competence to Assist and Consult in 
Capital Cases, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 417 (2004). 
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for all.  Finality drives Justice Powell’s reasoning in Ford, which, decided in 
1986, corresponded with limitations by the Supreme Court, in the name of 
finality and federalism, on the scope of federal habeas corpus review of state 
court judgments.153 
Justice Powell argued that “a standard that focused on the defendant’s 
ability to assist in his defense would give too little weight to the State’s interest 
[in finality],”154 and noted that whereas at common law execution “followed 
fairly quickly after trial, so that incompetence at the time of execution was 
linked as a practical matter with incompetence at the trial itself,”155 today there 
is far more collateral review, and more constitutional procedural rights are 
available to criminal defendants, including effective assistance of counsel at 
trial and on direct appeal.156  By the time a death row prisoner faces imminent 
execution, the argument goes, we are sufficiently certain of guilt and death-
worthiness.157 
Despite advances in procedural protections for capital defendants during 
trial, appeal, and through state and federal habeas corpus proceedings in some 
jurisdictions, however, there is a crack in the framework through which some 
prisoners who are severely mentally ill but actually innocent or innocent of the 
death penalty will pass.  If a prisoner is incompetent during collateral review, 
the proceedings cannot assuredly root out trial error, nor can they reliably 
uncover issues of innocence that would found an application for executive 
clemency.  This was Justice Marshall’s argument.  Others, including the 
American Bar Association, take this position today, emphasizing that a 
reliability component of competence in the execution context is needed to 
 
 153. On the day the Court decided Ford, it also decided Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 
(1986), which established a strict factual innocence standard for meeting the miscarriage of 
justice exception to state procedural default, and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), which 
replaced the lenient “deliberate bypass” procedural default standard with the stricter “cause” and 
“prejudice” test. 
 154. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 421 n.2 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 155. Id. at 420–21 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)). 
 156. Id.  In Coe, the Sixth Circuit offered another argument against the capacity to assist 
counsel as a factor in Ford determinations, questioning “how a prisoner could assist his counsel, a 
mental health professional, or the trial judge in deciding on his competency when the prisoner’s 
very competency is the matter at issue.”  Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 826 (6th Cir. 2000).  This 
reasoning misses the point, which is that the prisoner may recall facts—not necessarily relevant to 
a competency determination—that are exculpatory. 
 157. In Rohan v. Woodford the Ninth Circuit held that federal law declaring the right to 
counsel in collateral proceedings implies a right to competence rooted in communication with 
counsel.  334 F.3d 803, 812–13 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Reid v. State, 197 S.W.3d 694, 707 
(Tenn. 2006) (Birch, J., concurring) (arguing that competence for post-conviction review needs 
an assistance component).  Rohan, however, did not address execution competence and took the 
precedence of Powell’s Ford opinion as given. 
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protect actual innocence and “innocence of the death penalty.”158  This 
argument encompasses the circumstances in Panetti, where the defendant was 
permitted, despite strong indications of incompetence, to represent himself at 
trial.159  Along the same lines, states that kept the “assistance” component after 
Ford did so because of its importance to clemency.160 
In the twenty-plus years since Justice Powell dismissed this crack in the 
framework and in the fifteen-plus years since Rector, more than one hundred 
prisoners have been exonerated from death row.161  As with wrongful 
convictions generally, only approximately twenty-five percent of these 
exonerations are based on DNA evidence,162 so this is not merely a scientific 
matter on which a prisoner would have no meaningful input.163  Indeed, the 
modern history of execution in this country is replete with last minute stays 
 
 158. See Bonnie, supra note 29, at 552 n.51; see also Bonnie, supra note 9, at 282 
(recognizing that the procedural protections in capital trials and appeal, though complex, do not 
protect against the risk that jurors regard mental illness as an aggravating, rather than a 
mitigating, factor); Bonnie, supra note 7, at 1169 (same). 
 159. Texas courts found Panetti competent to stand trial and to represent himself despite a 
history of schizophrenia, present evidence of incompetence, and previous findings of 
incompetence.  See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2848–49 (2007).  
Panetti was found competent while taking anti-psychotic medication, which he stopped taking 
shortly prior to trial, and did not resume: Panetti represented himself in this unmedicated 
condition.  Id.  Because Panetti did not raise a claim of present incompetence during collateral 
appeals, the determination of competence to be executed was crucial—Panetti’s entire trial and 
habeas proceedings may have been conducted while he lacked competence.  See id. at 2849. 
 160. MO. REV. STAT. § 552.060(1) (1978); accord MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57(2)(b) 
(1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001 (1983); Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1243 (1991) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 161. See Death Penalty Information Center, Exonerations by Year, http://deathpenalty 
info.org/innocence-and-death-penalty#inn-yr-rc (last visited Feb. 15, 2009); Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (weighing this fact in deciding that 
imposition of the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment). 
 162. Innocence Project, Causes of Wrongful Conviction, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) (“Those exonerated by DNA testing aren’t the only people 
who have been wrongfully convicted in recent decades. For every case that involves DNA, there 
are thousands that do not.”); Samuel Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 551 (2005) (finding that leading causes of 
exonerations for murder are eyewitness misidentification and false confessions, primarily by 
juveniles and individuals who have mental illness); accord Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, 
The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004) (same); 
cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008) (examining only 
DNA-based post-conviction exonerations). 
 163. Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 579–80 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Federal habeas corpus happens 
to be one of the most complex areas of American law.  With respect to many of the issues that 
arise in habeas corpus cases, a lay person has nothing to contribute to his lawyer’s strategy.  But it 
can be different with respect to other issues, several presented in this case, notably prosecutorial 
misconduct at trial and ineffective assistance by trial counsel.”). 
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based on meaningful newly discovered evidence.164  Whatever one’s views on 
the likelihood that an innocent prisoner has already been executed, or the 
likelihood that the system will eventually execute someone demonstrably 
innocent, these are prevalent concerns in the administration of the death 
penalty165 that doubts about the quality of capital post-conviction 
representation amplify.166 
In addition to procedural protections, one might talk of procedural bars.  
What could a prisoner possibly say at the last minute that could overcome the 
extremely high standards for raising a belated, “successive” constitutional 
claim through innocence gateways?167  The AEDPA’s procedural hurdles may 
make such circumstances less likely, but does unlikelihood render the 
reliability interest served by the capacity to assist counsel unnecessary or 
obsolete?  Justice Marshall and Professor Bonnie, among others, provide a 
credible argument that it does not.168 
Miller and Radelet said that drawing the line on the issue of whether a 
prisoner’s mental illness precludes retributive internalization of the punishment 
may be a “godlike” decision, requiring such fine parsings that it is ultimately 
more a moral judgment than a legal one.169 The decision of how far to protect 
reliability and avoid executing those with something meaningful to add in 
defense also has a moral dimension.  In the Eighth Amendment context, where 
reliability is prized most highly, and the price of error at the execution stage is 
irreversibly high, sacrificing reliability where some doubt exists is a needless 
 
 164. See Chamblee, supra note 83, at 347 n.93.  How, the commentator asks, can the process 
be deemed to work at the end stage when no one asks whether the prisoner is capable of 
assisting?  See id. at 348.  She rightly questions how it can be deemed full process if newly 
discovered information arrives at the last minute and courts do not consider the prisoner’s input 
on the information, regardless of how many appeals were previously denied.  Id. at 348–49. 
 165. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 184–99 (2006); id. at 207–11 (Souter, J., 
dissenting); see, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual 
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007) (assessing wrongful 
conviction rate of capital rape-murders in 1980s and arguing for systemic reform). 
 166. See generally TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, LETHAL INDIFFERENCE: THE FATAL 
COMBINATION OF INCOMPETENT ATTORNEYS AND UNACCOUNTABLE COURTS (2002) 
(discussing cases in which proof of innocence, death-ineligibility, or diminished death-
worthiness, never came to the attention of the court due to very poor post-conviction 
representation). 
 167. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Sawyer 
v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). 
 168. Before Justice Marshall, Justice Frankfurter argued fear of protracted litigation was 
“groundless” and “hardly comparable to the grim risk” of executing an incompetent prisoner.  
Solesbee v. Balcom, 339 U.S. 9, 25 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 169. MILLER & RADELET, supra note 83, at xii, 107 (“The vagueness of the criteria makes the 
personal values of the examining experts extremely important.”); see Bonnie, supra note 29, at 
540 n.1 (stating that competency in any context “ultimately is a legal conclusion with inescapably 
moral dimensions”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] THE AFTERLIFE OF FORD AND PANETTI 347 
and unwise choice.  In this “period of new empirical argument about how 
‘death is different,’”170 a few cases in which prisoners with severe mental 
illness have something exculpatory to say, about actual innocence or innocence 
of the death penalty, provide reason enough to have this additional safeguard. 
“In the face of evidence of the hazards of capital prosecution,”171 unless 
the Court discards Ford analysis altogether for a categorical exemption on 
executing individuals with severe mental illness,172 courts must fully consider 
whether the capacity to assist counsel and to communicate a defense—indeed, 
the capacity to reason—is part of the Eighth Amendment framework for 
execution incompetence.  The issue remains, as in Rector in 1991, “open,” 
“unsettled,” “recurring,” and “important.” 
CONCLUSION 
In one of the earliest law review articles to call for an Eighth Amendment 
bar against executing individuals with severe mental illness, the commentator 
noted that the Eighth Amendment’s “concern with structured discretion, 
particularized consideration, and minimization of error demands a definition of 
insanity tailored to the need of this unique proceeding.”173  He envisioned a 
test that was “not a rigid psychiatric standard,” but “broad enough to apply to 
other condemned prisoners if changing community standards or developing 
medical knowledge permits other prisoners to qualify for the exemption from 
execution.”174  It would require that the prisoner understand the nature of the 
proceedings, the purposes and extent of the punishment, and the fate that 
awaits, but “[m]oreover . . . possess sufficient understanding to be aware of 
any facts that may make his punishment unjust, and have the ability to convey 
 
 170. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting); see id. at 208–09 (“[T]he same risks of 
falsity that infect proof of guilt raise questions about sentences, when the circumstances of the 
crime are aggravating factors and bear on predictions of future dangerousness.”). 
 171. Id. at 211. 
 172. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 77; see also Christopher Slobogin, Mental 
Disorder as an Exemption from the Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, 
54 CATH U. L. REV. 1133 (2005); Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People 
with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003).  Some suggested after Ford that the generality 
of its language reflected societal ambiguity on the death penalty and foretold such an exemption.  
See Jonathan L. Entin, Psychiatry, Insanity, and the Death Penalty: A Note on Implementing 
Supreme Court Decisions, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218, 239 (1988) (suggesting Ford was 
a stopgap for a forthcoming categorical exemption on executing prisoners with severe mental 
illness, which future evolving standards of decency would help to define); The Supreme Court, 
1985 Term—Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 106–07 (1978) (suggesting that a society 
and Court divided on whether state killing is acceptable cannot agree on a substantive standard 
for executing the mentally incompetent). 
 173. Note, supra note 14, at 561. 
 174. Id. at 562 n.169. 
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such information to his attorney.”175  He concluded that such an assessment, 
both dignity and reliability-based, would satisfy the Eighth Amendment 
because it accords with the common law history and is “directed at the 
circumstances of the condemned prisoner.”176  The Supreme Court has never 
considered whether the capacity to assist counsel should be a part of the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on executing people who have severe mental illness.  
In the years since Ford, ever fewer courts and counsel have.  After Panetti, all 
should. 
 
 
 
 175. Id. at 562. 
 176. Id. 
